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ABSTRACT	
	
Proposition	13	created	disparities	in	property	taxation	throughout	the	state	of	
California	after	passage	of	the	law	in	1978.		This	paper	examines	connections	between	
disparities	in	taxation	of	differing	land	use	types,	specifically	residential	and	commercial,	to	
the	fiscal	health	of	local	governments.		Demographic	factors	and	spatial	relationships	in	San	
Diego	County,	CA	were	also	examined	in	relationship	to	fiscal	health.		Using	county	level	
parcel	and	U.S.	Census	data,	spatial	analysis	techniques	and	regression	analysis	are	used	to	
examine	the	impacts	of	Proposition	13	through	testing	the	hypothesis	that	the	greater	the	
tax	burden	disparity	between	residential	and	commercial	property,	the	poorer	the	fiscal	
health	of	the	community.		The	findings	indicate	a	positive	relationship	between	poverty	
level,	unemployment,	and	housing	cost	burden	to	areas	of	high	inequality	in	residential	to	
commercial	tax	burden.		Conversely,	census	tracts	with	high	income,	homeownership,	and	
college	degree	showed	a	negative	relationship	to	residential/commercial	tax	disparity	and	
also	to	municipal	fiscal	health.		The	population	variable	of	race	(white,	black,	and	Hispanic)	
showed	the	strongest	relationships	to	both	property	tax	equity	and	municipal	fiscal	health.		
Each	of	the	dependent	variables	considered	exhibited	spatial	dependence	signifying	that	
the	spatial	occurrence	of	the	variables	is	not	random	and	depends	on	the	existence	of	those	
variables	at	neighboring	census	tracts.	
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Chapter	1	
	
INTRODUCTION	
 
 
America	was	founded	in	revolt	and	on	a	principle.		The	principle	was	‘‘No	taxation	
without	representation,’’	protesting	the	absence	of	colonists’	representation	in	England	on	
decisions	relating	to	the	colonial	power’s	ability	to	extract	payment	for	the	support	of	
government.		Over	200	years	later,	1978’s	Proposition	13	in	California	became	the	modern	
incarnation	of	taxpayer	revolt	in	America.	Voters	found	that	they	could	go	into	a	voting	
booth	and	award	themselves	a	$7	billion	property	tax	break.		Other	state	and	local	tax	and	
expenditure	limitations	(TELs)	like	Proposition	13	had	been	imposed	throughout	our	
nation’s	history	and	the	trend	had	accelerated	in	the	1970s.		Both	the	level	of,	and	
dissatisfaction	with,	taxes	swept	across	the	United	States.			
In	1978,	California	voters	approved	Proposition	13	legislation,	limiting	property	
taxes	to	1	percent	of	a	property's	market	value	and	limiting	the	property's	growth	in	
market	value	to	2	percent	per	year.		Additionally,	when	a	property	is	sold,	it	is	reassessed	at	
its	full	market	value	AND	local	governments	are	prohibited	from	imposing	any	other	
property	taxes,	sales	taxes,	or	transactions	taxes	on	real	property.		The	measure	was	
drastic	and	instantaneous	in	both	its	effect	on	municipal	tax	rolls	and	overall	tax	fairness.		
Although	this	allocation	scheme	was	designed	to	reflect	local	jurisdiction	obligations	and	
priorities	at	the	time,	much	has	changed	since	then	and	the	constraints	of	local	
governments	have	led	to	many	unintended	consequences.		Both	local	government	officials	
and	state	legislators	agree	that	the	current	system	is	unfair,	outdated,	inflexible,	and	has	
led	to	inefficient	land	use	decisions	(McCarty).	
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“Perhaps	the	most	widely	accepted	principle	of	equity	in	taxation	is	that	people	in	
equal	positions	should	be	treated	equally.”		The	principle	of	equality,	or	horizontal	equity,	
is	fundamental	to	the	ability‐to‐pay	approach	within	taxation	(Musgrave	1959,	p.	160).		
Horizontal	equity	measures	the	taxation	of	people	in	similar	position.		In	the	case	of	
property	taxes	this	means	that	two	houses	of	similar	size	and	value	should	pay	similar	
taxes.		Conversely,	the	matter	of	vertical	equity	addresses	how	the	taxation	of	people	in	
different	positions	should	vary.		In	this	case	equity	is	measured	by	the	progressivity	of	the	
tax	where	property	of	high	value	should	pay	a	higher	tax	than	property	of	a	lower	value.		
Musgrave	also	offered,	“The	requirements	of	horizontal	and	vertical	equity	are	but	different	
sides	of	the	same	coin.”		In	keeping	with	Musgrave’s	contention,	this	study	considers	both	
forms	of	equity.		
The	initial	and	obvious	result	of	Proposition	13	in	California	is	horizontal	inequity	in	
the	property	tax	burden,	in	which	properties	are	now	taxed	based	on	their	value	at	the	time	
of	purchase	rather	than	their	true	market	value.		In	California	properties	of	the	exact	same	
assessed	value	pay	different	property	tax	amounts.			
Proposition	13	also	highlighted	the	existence	of	vertical	inequities,	in	which	
properties	of	differing	value	are	proportionally	taxed	(higher	value,	higher	tax).		Vertical	
inequity	has	been	documented	in	previous	studies	that	show	residential	and	commercial	
property	values	have	shifted	since	the	passage	of	Proposition	13	(California	Tax	Reform	
Association	(CTRA)).		This	analysis	will	build	upon	previous	work	by	measuring	and	
assessing	the	spatial	distribution	of	the	vertical	inequities	that	were	created	by	Proposition	
13.		One	theory	is	that	vertical	inequity	is	created	by	the	turnover	rates	post	Proposition	
13.		Properties	types	with	high	turnover	rates	will	show	more	recent	base	assessed	values	
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than	properties	with	long	term	ownership	and	those	values	are	typically	associated	with	
high	income	and	commercial	zoned	property	types.			
Vertical	equity	varies	from	context	to	context	and	is	conceptualized	in	many	
different	ways,	as	described	in	greater	detail	in	Chapter	2.		The	basic	idea	is	that	persons	or	
properties	of	a	higher	income	or	value	should	pay	a	higher	tax	if	conditions	are	to	be	
considered	vertically	equitable.		It	has	been	established	that	the	conditions	of	residential	to	
commercial	property	tax	equity	have	changed	in	San	Diego	County	since	the	passage	of	
Proposition	13	(CAL).		The	fact	is	that	commercial	properties	pay	significantly	less	in	taxes	
since	the	passage	of	Proposition	13,	even	when	accounting	for	population	and	employment	
growth,	according	to	a	study	by	CAL	comparing	effective	tax	rates	by	land	use	before	the	
passage	of	Proposition	13	and	in	2010.			
This	study	uses	spatial	data	analysis	techniques	to	examine	whether	the	impacts	of	
inequities	created	between	residential	and	commercial	land	use	taxation	by	Proposition	13	
have	a	direct	relationship	to	poor	municipal	fiscal	health.			More	specifically,	the	research	
questions	are:		:	(a)	to	what	extent	is	municipal	fiscal	health	in	San	Diego	County	predicted	
by	disparities	in	assessed	value	by	land	use	types	in	San	Diego	County	and	(b)	are	
disparities	in	assessed	value	by	land	use	types	in	San	Diego	County	predicted	by	economic	
and	demographic	variables	that	indicate	prosperity?			
This	analysis	demonstrates	that	municipalities	in	San	Diego	County	(IMAGE	1)	that	
score	low	on	a	test	of	fiscal	health	also	exhibit	a	greater	reliance	on	residential	property	
taxes	instead	of	commercial	property	taxes.		Regression	analysis	is	also	used	to	explore	the	
linkages	between	demographic	characteristics	and	fiscal	health	at	the	municipal	level	and	
census	tract	commercial	property	tax	burden.	
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In	the	coming	chapters	I	will	first	present	a	literature	review	that	outlines	the	
history	of	property	taxation	in	the	United	States,	basics	on	tax	theory	and	tax	fairness,		and	
the	modern	tax	revolt	including	the	passage	of	Proposition	13.		In	Chapter	3,	I	detail	the	
specific	research	problem	and	present	the	variables,	materials,	and	instruments	used	to	
reveal	the	relationship	between	tax	inequities	in	San	Diego	County	and	the	variables	
chosen	to	study.		Next,	Chapter	4	includes	the	specific	preparations	and	measures	used	to	
organize	the	data	for	regression	and	spatial	analysis.		This	chapter	also	explains	the	
exploratory	spatial	methods	used	to	describe	the	data	and	the	calculation	of	municipal	
fiscal	health.		The	last	two	chapters	contain	the	results	tables	of	the	regression	and	spatial	
analysis	as	well	as	findings,	conclusions,	and	policy	recommendations	regarding	both	tax	
equity	and	Proposition	13.	
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IMAGE	1:					San	Diego	County,	Study	Area	
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Chapter	2	
LITERATURE	REVIEW	
	
History	of	Property	Taxation	in	the	United	States	
	
Unlike	sales	and	income	taxes,	which	are	20th	Century	phenomena,	the	taxation	of	
land	in	the	United	States	has	a	longer	and	more	varied	history.		In	fact,	four	states	were	
listed	as	taxing	the	“mass	of	property”	(Benson,	et	al)	in	a	1796	survey.		By	the	time	the	first	
Census	of	Governments	was	taken	in	1902,	all	states	employed	the	property	tax	and	it	
compromised	more	than	60	percent	of	revenue	for	state	and	local	governments	(Wallis,	
2000).		For	many	reasons	discussed	in	this	chapter,	the	property	tax	has	been	unpopular	
with	Americans	and	resulting	has	a	sordid	history	within	public	finance.		By	1992,	the	
property	tax	accounted	for	only	18	percent	of	state	and	local	revenues	(Wallis,	2000).	
Wallis	(2000)	identified	three	distinct	systems	of	government	finance	between	1790	
and	1990.	The	first	fiscal	period	extended	from	1790	to	about	1842,	during	which	state	
governments	took	the	lead	in	promoting	economic	development	through	infrastructure	
investment	in	transportation	and	legal	innovation	to	promote	corporations	and	banking.	
Canal	transportation	was	critical	to	development	of	the	western	lands	(Wallis	2001).	Wallis	
noted	that	a	property	tax	compromise	in	Ohio,	which	recognized	that	land	near	
transportation,	would	have	higher	value,	changed	the	land	valuation	basis	from	three	flat	
per‐acre	rates	to	valuation	and	led	to	passage	of	the	1825	Canal	Law	that	provided	funding	
for	construction	of	major	canals	in	the	state.		The	major	source	of	funding	for	these	projects	
still	resided	in	corporate	and	banking	taxes.		When	the	financial	markets	struggled,	many	of	
the	construction	projects	were	scrapped	and	land	value	plummeted.		By	the	late	1830s,	the	
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combined	states	had	eight	times	more	debt	than	the	national	and	local	governments	
combined.	
The	second	era	of	government	finance	began	to	unfold	in	the	1840s.	An	economic	
depression	caused	states	to	approach	debt	default	status	and	local	governments	took	the	
lead	with	most	of	the	important	infrastructure	investment	in	education,	highways,	water	
systems,	sewer	systems,	and	public	utilities,	financed	by	the	property	tax,	which	grew	to	
become	the	most	important	source	of	revenue	for	local	and	state	governments.	The	Great	
Depression	and	the	New	Deal	ushered	in	the	third	era	of	government	finance	that	
continued	through	the	end	of	the	20th	century.	The	third	era	has	featured	national	
domestic	programs,	including	infrastructure	investment,	funded	from	the	federal	level	by	
income	tax	revenues	and	administered	by	state	and	local	governments,	as	well	as	a	national	
system	of	defense	and	retirement	security.	Income	and	consumption	taxes	became	the	
predominant	forms	of	revenue	at	the	national	and	state	levels,	while	the	property	tax	
remained	the	main	tax	revenue	source	at	the	local	government	level.	
According	to	Wallis	(2001),	government	revenue	in	1840	was	about	4%	of	gross	
national	product	(GNP)	with	local	government	comprising	about	33%	of	the	total.	By	1902,	
total	government	revenue	had	grown	to	7.3%	of	GNP	and	local	government	accounted	for	
over	half	of	that	amount.	Wallis	(2001)	reported	that	between	1902	and	1992,	local	
government	revenue	less	than	doubled	from	4%	to	7.3%	of	GNP,	while	federal	government	
revenue	increased	seven‐fold	to	21%	of	GNP	and	state	government	revenue	increased	
more	than	11	times	to	9.3%	of	GNP.	During	the	same	90‐year	period,	the	property	tax	share	
of	total	revenue	at	all	levels	of	government	decreased	from	about	42%	to	less	than	10%,	
with	the	national	and	state	shares	approaching	zero	and	the	local	share	declining	from	
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approximately	74%	to	45%	Wallis	(2001).	The	size	of	government	relative	to	the	GNP	is	
determined	by	the	cost	of	the	functions	and	services	that	it	commits	to	provide	for	its	
citizens,	not	by	the	revenue	structure.	After	researching	the	history	of	American	
government	finance,	Wallis	(2000,	p.80)	concluded	that,	“There	is	no	substantive	evidence	
to	suggest	that	tinkering	with	the	revenue	structure	will	change	the	size	of	government.”	
As	Proposition	13	had	been	put	on	the	ballot	through	the	legislative	initiative	
process,	its	descendants	appeared	most	rapidly	and	widely	in	those	states	where	voters	
had	direct	access	to	the	ballot.		Legislators	in	states	with	the	initiative	process	often	either	
passed	their	own	TEL	measures	or	put	legislatively	crafted	limits	up	for	referendum	in	an	
effort	to	prevent	more	severe	voter‐initiated	action.	Legislators	in	states	without	the	
initiative	often	did	the	same,	fearful	of	retribution	at	reelection	time	for	failure	to	act.	
Within	two	years	of	the	passage	of	Proposition	13,	43	states	had	implemented	some	kind	of	
property	tax	limitation	or	relief,	15	lowered	their	income	tax	rates,	and	10	indexed	their	
income	taxes	for	inflation	(Mullins	and	Wallin	2004).		
The	main	purpose	of	this	historical	review	has	been	to	provide	a	framework	for	
understanding	property	tax	administration	as	it	relates	to	the	subject	of	equity,	which	has	
been	intertwined	with	a	general	debate	about	the	theory	and	practice	of	its	administration	
that	has	lasted	at	least	125	years.		The	value	of	a	long	historical	view	of	the	property	tax	is	
to	recall	an	earlier	time	when	states	moved	away	from	the	property	tax	just	as	they	did	in	
the	1970s	and	1980s.		Local	governments,	though,	rarely	follow	suit.		The	difference	here	is	
that	local	jurisdictions	can	match	the	benefit	of	the	property	tax	to	its	constituents,	where	
states	cannot.	
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Tax	Theory	
	
	
	 The	theory	of	real	property	taxation	simply	states	that	every	property	in	a	local	
municipality	shall	share	in	the	cost	of	the	services	that	its	citizens	require	in	proportion	to	
the	value	of	that	real	property.		Additionally,	according	to	Tiebout’s	Pure	Theory	of	local	
expenditures,	people	would	chose	to	live	in	an	area	with	higher	taxation	with	the	
expectation	of	a	higher	level	of	benefit	(1956).		Viewing	the	real	property	tax	as	a	
distributive	allocation	tool	for	the	shared	cost	of	local	government	public	goods	and	
services	is	widely	known	as	the	benefit	view	of	taxation.		Assessing	the	tax	according	to	real	
estate	value	incorporates	relative	wealth	in	the	allocation	device.	The	tax	could	be	levied	as	
a	fixed	specific	assessment	upon	each	property,	but	including	the	wealth	dimension	insures	
equity	in	the	formation	of	a	progressive	tax.		The	property	tax	is	levied	upon	wealth	as	
represented	by	the	value	of	real	estate.		When	the	property	tax	is	seen	as	a	tax	upon	wealth,	
then	for	both	taxpayers	and	voters,	their	homes	represent	the	single	largest	asset	and	to	a	
certain	extent	is	a	proxy	for	their	relative	wealth	(Fischel,	2001).		Other	major	forms	of	
taxation	in	the	United	States	at	the	start	of	the	21st	Century	were	the	federal	income	tax,	
state	income	tax,	and	general	sales	tax,	and	for	the	most	part	these	are	all	20th	Century	
creations,	as	noted	earlier.			Note	that	some	excise	taxes	such	as	tariffs,	tobacco	taxes,	and	
alcohol	taxes,	that	are	not	general	sales	taxes,	existed	before	the	Revolutionary	War	‐	the	
Boston	Tea	Party	was	essentially	a	protest	against	just	such	an	excise	tax.		
A	critical	distinction	is	that	the	20th	Century	tax	innovations	are	based	upon	income	
or	consumption	rather	than	wealth.	The	United	States	is	characterized	by	a	tax	structure	
and	political	economy	of	fiscal	federalism	where	it	is	simpler	to	levy	income	taxes	at	the	
central	government	levels	(federal	and	state)	because	those	taxes	are	progressive	and	
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redistribution	can	be	conducted	more	efficiently.		Consumption	taxes	in	the	form	of	excise	
taxes	are	less	visible	to	the	taxpayer	who	bears	the	burden	because	they	are	imposed	
earlier	in	the	supply	chain.		For	the	sake	of	efficiency,	consumption	taxes	in	the	form	of	
general	sales	taxes	are	administered	at	the	state	level	even	if	part	of	the	tax	revenue	is	
distributed	federally	and	locally.	
The	idealized	property	tax	on	wealth	has	evolved	into	a	local	tax	that	is	directly	tied	
to	the	benefits	and	services	provided	for	the	real	estate	owners	that	lie	within	the	
jurisdictional	boundary	from	which	it	is	collected.	Hence,	citizens	determine	their	own	total	
tax	burden	through	their	income,	spending,	and	real	estate	investment	decisions.		When	
citizens	purchase	real	estate,	they	“vote	with	their	feet”	about	where	to	buy	according	to	
the	Tiebout	Model	(Tiebout,	1956).		The	model	posits	that	buyers	evaluate	the	benefits	of	
the	public	goods	offered	by	alternative	communities	just	as	they	would	other	goods,	
causing	local	governments	to	compete	and	thus,	be	responsive	to	the	needs	of	their	citizens	
and	prospective	citizens	(Fischel,	2000).	
Despite	its	intuitive	appeal,	scholars	have	not	consistently	interpreted	the	ability‐to‐
pay	approach.		With	respect	to	the	property	tax,	many	scholars	(Musgrave,	Plummer)	have	
incorporated	personal	income	levels	in	property	tax	equity	research	as	a	common	
yardstick	for	comparing	differing	state	tax	systems	because	the	legal	tax	bases	are	
different.		However,	this	can	easily	lead	to	property	tax	regressivity	because	persons	at	
lower	income	levels	spend	a	greater	portion	of	their	income	on	housing	than	those	at	
higher	income	levels	(Martin	and	Citrin,	2009).		
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Rosen	(1992)	pointed	out	that	although	a	great	amount	of	economic	research	has	
considered	how	housing	property	taxation	is	based	upon	property	value	as	a	measure	of	
wealth	consistent	with	the	ability‐to‐pay	maxim,	an	argument	can	be	made	from	the	benefit	
view	that	the	property	tax	is	in	fact	a	progressive	tax	because	each	property	would	receive	
similar	benefits	(police	protection,	public	works,	schools,	streets,	etc.),	yet	the	higher	
valued	properties	must	pay	higher	tax	amounts	and	receive	equal	benefits.		Hence,	higher	
value	property	owners	must	pay	more	per	unit	of	public	benefit	received,	even	though	
effective	tax	rates	are	equal.	Thus,	ability‐to‐pay	is	accounted	for	under	the	benefit	view	of	
the	property	tax.	
Three	theoretical	views	concerning	the	issue	of	who	ultimately	bears	the	burden	of	
the	property	tax	exist	in	the	literature:	(a)	the	traditional	view,	which	argues	that	the	
property	tax	is	fully	shifted	forward	to	consumers	in	the	form	of	higher	housing	prices,	(b)	
the	benefit	view,	which	argues	that	the	property	tax	is	simply	a	payment	for	local	public	
goods	and	services	received,	and	(c)	the	new	view,	which	argues	that	the	property	tax	is	a	
distortionary	tax	on	the	use	of	capital	within	a	local	jurisdiction	(Zodrow	2001).		There	is	
continuing	debate	among	economists	concerning	the	efficiency	of	the	property	tax.	Some	
such	as	Fischel,	support	the	benefit	view	and	argue	that	the	property	tax	is	efficient,	while	
others	like	Zodrow	view	the	property	tax	much	like	excise	taxes	in	that	they	have	a	
distorting	effect	on	local	decisions	and	tend	to	discourage	the	use	of	capital.		
Tax	Fairness:	Equity	and	Studies	Measuring	Equity	
	
	
Though	inequities	exist	in	most	forms	of	taxation,	Proposition	13	focused	attention	
on	the	regressive	nature	of	this	particular	type	of	property	taxation.		By	exacerbating	the	
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level	of	both	horizontal	and	vertical	inequity	within	California	taxation,	the	state	may	have	
contributed	to	its	current	financial	crisis.		There	are	several	ways	in	which	California’s	TEL	
contributes	to	horizontal	inequity.	Properties	with	high	turn‐over	rates	(e.g.,	low	income	
residential	and	rental)	typically	pay	a	higher	portion	of	the	tax	burden	in	a	community	than	
stable	low	turn‐over	properties	(e.g.,	high	value	residential	and	commercial	properties),	
further	encumbering	the	most	vulnerable	citizens	within	a	community.		This	is	a	clear	
example	of	the	unintended	consequences	of	keeping	taxes	low	in	California.		For	example,	a	
home	valued	at	$100,000	in	California	in	1978	would	have	a	2005	market	value	of	
$750,000	and	an	assessed	value	of	approximately	$170,000.		A	similar	$100,000	home	sold	
in	2005	would	have	a	market	value	of	$750,000	and	an	assessed	value	of	$750,000.		This	
amounts	to	low	taxes	and	high	values	for	long‐time	owners	and	high	taxes	for	short	term	
homeowners	of	a	SIMILARLY	valued	property.	This	is	the	epitome	of	horizontal	inequity.		
Further,	when	comparing	California	and	the	U.S.	in	2007,	home	owners	who	occupied	their	
homes	before	1978	paid	only	$1,571	in	property	taxes	compared	to	the	national	average	of	
$1,994.			In	contrast,	home	owners	who	bought	their	homes	between	2003	and	2007	paid	
$4,787	in	property	taxes	compared	to	the	national	average	of	$2,848	(Meyers	2009).	
	 Vertical	inequity	in	Proposition	13	is	a	more	difficult	concept	to	measure.		Sexton	et	
al.	(2002),	found	that	vertical	inequities	due	to	acquisition	have	shifted	the	tax	burden	in	
California	from	commercial	to	residential	properties.		In	the	10	years	after	Proposition	13	
was	enacted	total	assessed	value	in	the	state	of	homesteads	increased	from	32%	to	40%	
(O’Sullivan,	1995).		Acquisition	value	systems	put	residential	properties	at	a	tax	
disadvantage	because	homes	typically	change	ownership	more	often	than	businesses.		For	
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the	purposes	of	this	study,	the	portion	of	assessed	value	per	residentially	zoned	census	
tract	is	used	as	the	measure	of	vertical	inequity.	
	 The	California	Tax	Reform	Association	(CTRA)	released	a	report	in	2010	that	shows	
that	the	property	tax	burden	has	shifted	from	commercial	and	industrial	property	to	
residential	property	in	virtually	every	county	in	the	state	since	the	passage	of	Proposition	
13	in	1978.			The	data	are	consistent	throughout	California:		in	every	county,	the	share	of	
the	property	tax	borne	by	residential	property	has	increased	since	the	passage	of	
Proposition	13	in	1978,	while	the	share	of	the	property	tax	borne	by	non‐residential	
property	has	decreased.		For	example,	in	Contra	Costa	County,	the	residential	share	of	the	
property	tax	increased	from	48%	to	73%	during	this	period	and	in	Santa	Clara	County,	the	
residential	share	grew	from	50%	to	64%,	despite	massive	industrial/commercial	growth.		
In	Los	Angeles	County,	it	increased	from	53%	to	69%,	went	from	59%	to	72%	in	Orange	
County,	and	climbed	from	73%	to	86%	in	San	Diego	County.			
Proposition	13	significantly	restricts	the	taxes	that	residential	property	taxpayers	
pay,	but	at	the	same	time	it	restricts	the	taxes	that	commercial	and	industrial	taxpayers	
contribute	to	the	public	coffers	to	a	much	greater	degree.		In	particular,	the	CTRA	report	
found	that	California’s	commercial	property	tax	system	is	“inconsistently	applied	in	many	
counties”	and	continues	“We	believe	that	there	are	many	properties,	particularly	the	banks	
and	other	commercial	properties,	which	should	have	been	reassessed	but	have	not	been,	
and	found	that	some	counties	have	assessed	these	properties	while	others	have	not.”		The	
property	transfers	examined	are	predominantly	those	of	private	equity	buyouts,	corporate	
purchases	of	companies,	and	bank	mergers	which	have	avoided	reassessment.	This	
oversight	has	allowed	for	many	types	of	commercial	property	to	avoid	assessment	upon	
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sale	of	the	property	resulting	in	commercial	zoned	properties	paying	a	lesser	portion	of	the	
tax	burden.		At	this	point,	the	tax	levy	shifts	to	properties	that	are	less	likely	to	avoid	re‐
assessment:	residential.		For	example,	Hilton	Hotels	and	its	family	of	hotel	chains	(incl.	
Doubletree,	Embassy	Suites,	and	Hampton	Inn)	was	bought	by	the	Blackstone	Group	in	
October	2007	but	many	of	their	California‐based	hotel	properties	have	not	been	
reassessed.		Similarly,	Jiffy	Lube	was	purchased	by	Shell	Oil	in	2002,	but	very	few	of	the	
Jiffy	Lube	service	centers	have	been	reassessed.	Finally,	JP	Morgan	Chase	bought	
Washington	Mutual	(WaMu)	in	2008	for	$1.9	billion,	but	many	of	WaMu’s	assets	have	also	
not	been	reassessed	to	date.	
	
The	Tax	Revolt,	Tax	Limits,	and	Proposition	13	
	
	 	
From	the	colonial	period	and	throughout	most	of	the	19th	Century,	a	founding	
philosophy	espoused	by	the	citizens	of	the	new	United	States	of	America	was	the	concept	of	
fair	and	uniform	taxation–an	equal	sharing	of	the	cost	of	operating	the	new	government.	In	
fact,	the	Northwest	Ordinance	of	1787,	the	first	document	organizing	the	land	area	that	
comprises	the	present‐day	states	from	Ohio	to	the	northern	border	and	west	to	the	
Mississippi	River	as	part	of	the	United	States,	set	certain	conditions	for	a	property	tax	in	
that	area	in	Article	IV.		It	stated	“No	tax	shall	be	imposed	on	lands	the	property	of	the	
United	States,	and	in	no	case	shall	non‐resident	proprietors	be	taxed	higher	than	residents”	
(Stark,	1992).	However,	during	the	20th	Century,	this	philosophy	began	to	change	as	early	
as	the	1930s.		Special	interest	groups,	especially	homeowners	and	the	elderly,	sought	tax	
relief	in	the	form	of	various	exemptions	(Beito,	1996).		Exemptions	for	the	voting	majority	
steadily	gained	in	popularity	and	in	1978,	passage	of	Proposition	13	in	California	
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intensified	a	movement	toward	tax	relief	and	non‐uniformity	across	groups	of	property	
owners	(O’Sullivan,	Sexton	&	Sheffrin	1995).		The	property	tax	has	been	the	most	
important	source	of	revenue	for	state	and	local	government	finance	in	the	United	States.		
However,	during	the	final	quarter	of	the	20th	Century,	a	popular	tax	revolt	spread	across	
America.			
The	modern	tax	revolt	of	the	1970s	and	1980s	can	be	summarized	as	follows.		Due	
to	inflation	and	low	income	growth	since	the	Great	Depression,	the	share	of	income	
absorbed	by	property	taxes	nearly	doubled	(O’Sullivan,	1995).		To	alleviate	this	pressure	
put	on	homeowners,	cities	and	states	passed	legislation	that	limited	taxes	on	real	property	
in	several	different	ways.		The	result	was	four	different	types	of	property	tax	limits:	a)	
limits	on	the	tax	rate	for	a	specific	type	of	local	government,	b)	limits	on	the	tax	rate	for	
overall	local	spending,	c)	limits	on	property	tax	revenue	growth,	and	d)	limits	on	
assessment	growth.			
Limits	on	the	tax	rate	for	specific	type	of	government	(a)	are	the	most	common	form	
of	tax	and	expenditure	limits.		They	set	a	ceiling	that	cannot	be	exceeded	without	popular	
vote	and	only	apply	to	specific	types	of	local	jurisdictions	(e.g.,	counties,	municipalities	or	
school	districts).	
Overall	local	spending	limits	(b),	like	type	a	(above)	set	a	ceiling	that	cannot	be	
exceeded	without	a	popular	vote	but	applies	to	the	aggregate	tax	rate	of	all	local	
governments.		Ten	states	limit	rates	across	multiple	classifications	of	property	(sometimes	
at	different	rates):	Arizona’s	limit	applies	only	to	residential	property.		Additional	
variations	include	the	exclusion	of	debt	service,	special	purpose	and	excess	levies,	
exemptions	for	home	rule	jurisdictions,	and	general	override	provisions	through	popular	
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referenda.	California’s	override	system	requires	a	two‐thirds	supermajority,	but	the	
passage	of	Proposition	39	in	the	November	2000	election	lowers	this	threshold	to	55%	for	
bond	issuances	by	local	school	districts	(Mikhailov,	1998).	
Property	tax	levy	limits	(c)	constrain	total	revenue	that	can	be	raised	from	property	
tax,	independent	of	the	rate.	This	is	often	enacted	as	an	allowable	annual	percentage	
increase	in	the	levy.		Property	tax	revenue	(levy)	limits	specify	the	maximum	annual	
increases	in	revenue.		Some	states	impose	restrictions	on	allowable	increases	only	after	
property	is	revalued	and	26	states	currently	employ	overall	levy	limits	(Mikhailov,	1998).	
Limits	on	assessment	increases	(d)	control	the	ability	of	local	governments	to	raise	
revenue	by	reassessment	of	property	or	through	natural	or	administrative	escalation	of	
property	values.		They	are	potentially	binding	if	coupled	with	an	overall	or	specific	
property	tax	rate	limit	and	can	otherwise	easily	be	avoided	through	a	rate	increase.		Limits	
on	assessment	increases	restrict	local	government’s	ability	to	garner	increased	revenues	
from	rising	property	values	and/or	windfalls	from	reassessments.	The	limit	is	generally	
expressed	as	an	allowable	annual	percentage	increase	in	assessed	value.		Eighteen	states	
impose	limits	on	assessment	increases	(Mikhailov,	1998).		The	least	restrictive	limit	is	in	
Iowa,	where	the	assessment	limit	is	applied	statewide	on	classes	of	properties	(residential,	
agricultural	and	commercial)	rather	than	on	individual	properties.	Other	states	apply	the	
assessment	limit	individually	to	pieces	of	property.	Allowable	percentage	increases	range	
from	up	to	10	percent	(Arizona,	Maryland,	and	Texas)	to	2	percent	(California).		In	
California,	property	assessments	may	increase	with	inflation	up	to	2	percent	a	year.	If	
inflation	is	less	than	2	percent,	the	assessment	is	equivalent	to	that	percentage.		
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Though	these	measures	provided	immediate	tax	relief	to	voters	and	taxpayers,	they	
also	decreased	the	growth	rate	of	property	tax	revenue	and	caused	local	government	to	
seek	and	create	new	sources	of	income,	sometimes	offsetting	any	savings	gained	through	
the	property	tax	limit.		Most	importantly,	these	limits	reduced	the	amount	of	revenue	
controlled	at	the	local	level,	weakening	the	connection	between	local	taxes	and	local	
spending.	
There	is	a	cacophony	of	research	concerning	the	long	term	effects	of	property	tax	
limits	and	these	studies	typically	focus	first	on	their	relationship	with	property	tax	
revenue.		Do	property	tax	limits	actually	decrease	property	tax	revenue?		The	second	
commonly‐studied	topic	is	the	relationship	between	property	tax	limits	(often	increase)	
and	other	municipal	revenue	sources.		Sexton,	Sheffrin,	and	O’Sullivan	(1999)	note	that	in	
California,	Proposition	13	decreased	property	taxes	from	10.3	billion	in	1977	to	5.6	billion	
in	1978.		Even	though	tax	revenue	rose	throughout	the	next	decades,	up	to	19.5	billion	in	
1995,	it	was	still	lagging	by	almost	25%	in	real	dollars.		Shires	(1999),	Schwartz	(2004)	and	
Hoene	(2009)	all	found	that	as	the	share	of	state	and	local	revenue	from	taxes	decreased	
the	share	of	revenue	from	other	sources	such	as	intergovernmental	grants,	fees,	and	other	
charges.		These	studies	also	concluded	that	any	decrease	in	school	district	tax	share	was	
nearly	matched	by	the	intergovernmental	share.	
One	of	the	major	changes	in	the	wake	of	tax	limits	has	been	the	provision	of	local	
services.		According	to	Citrin	(1979),	38%	of	California	tax	voters	believed	that	state	and	
local	governments	could	absorb	a	40%	cut	in	revenue	and	still	provide	the	same	services.		
In	a	more	recent	study,	Steel	(1998)	found	that	high	sentiment	regarding	perceived	
government	inefficiency	and	waste	often	precipitated	voter	support	for	tax	limits.		
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Additionally,	as	property	tax	revenue	decreased	the	share	of	income	spent	on	K‐12	
education	also	decreased.			
	Martin	(2003)	argued	that	the	delay	in	modernization	of	assessment	practices	in	
the	United	States	attributable	to	political	factors	was	a	major	contributor	to	the	tax	revolts.			
Hawkins	(2006)	posited	that	a	“lax”	constitutional	amendment	process	in	Florida	(with	
similar	conditions	in	California)	was	instrumental	in	creating	the	“fiscal	train	wreck”	that	
he	saw	the	state	facing	in	the	near	future.			Hawkins	concluded	that	a	process	that	
facilitated	voter	initiative	measures	to	qualify	for	the	ballot	permitted	enactment	of	
Amendment	101		was	one	of	the	four	steps	to	fiscal	disaster.	The	Save	Our	Homes	provision	
allowed	homesteaders	to	enjoy	measured	assessment	increases	in	rapidly	appreciating	real	
estate	bubble	and	transfer	a	significant	part	their	share	of	the	property	tax	burden	to	new	
buyers,	homesteaders	in	slower	appreciating	markets,	and	non‐homestead	property	
owners.		Hawkins	concluded	that	the	effect	of	the	amendment	over	the	10‐year	period	
since	its	implementation	in	1995	was	an	increase	of	4700	percent	in	the	differential	
between	net	assessed	value	and	market	value	for	qualified	Florida	properties.		Enactment	
of	Save	Our	Homes	may	have	resulted	in	significant	bias	with	the	media	broadcasting	
stories	of	citizens	living	in	identical	houses	in	the	same	neighborhood	and	receiving	
enormously	different	property	tax	bills.		However,	“one	can	only	find	anecdotal	evidence	on	
disproportionate	benefits”	(Hawkins,2006,	p.	10).			In	an	economic	report	prepared	for	
Florida	Tax	Watch,		Morrell	(2006)	stated:	“Little	did	many	of	us	know	that	a	constitutional	
amendment	narrowly	passed	by	53.6%	in	1992	with	the	intent	of	keeping	residents	from	
                                                            
1 Popularly	known	as	Save	Our	Homes,	a	phrase	coined	by	its	proponents	during	the	1992	Florida	election. 
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being	taxed	out	of	their	homes	would,	by	2006,	be	a	contributing	source	of	tax	inequity	and	
a	potential	impact	to	the	vibrancy	of	Florida’s	economy	(p.	1)”.			
Florida’s	Amendment	10	is	similar	in	some	respects	to	California’s	Proposition	13.	
Both	evolved	in	the	relaxed	constitutional	amendment	environment	described	by	Hawkins,	
both	limit	the	year‐over‐year	increase	in	net	assessed	value,	and	both	reset	the	base	from	
which	the	allowable	increase	is	calculated	when	the	property	sells	to	a	new	owner.		Florida,	
however,	differs	in	important	ways	from	California	and	provides	an	opportunity	to	study	
the	effect	of	factors	never	present	on	the	ground	in	California.		Florida’s	Save	Our	Homes	
provision	only	applies	to	owner‐occupied	homes,	with	other	properties	offering	a	natural	
control	group	for	study.		In	addition,	Florida	property	appraisers	are	statutorily	required	to	
estimate	market	value	for	all	homes	annually,	whether	they	qualify	for	Save	Our	Homes	or	
not.			
	
Exploratory	Spatial	Data	Analysis	
	
	
Conventional	statistical	methods	are	often	unable	to	effectively	accommodate	data	
with	an	explicit	spatial	dimension.		Tobler’s	First	Law	of	Geography	holds	that	“everything	
is	related	to	everything	else,	but	near	things	are	more	related	than	distant	things”	(Tobler,	
1970,	p.	236),	which	is	an	intuitive	description	of	the	phenomenon	known	as	spatial	
autocorrelation.	Within	a	linear	regression	context,	the	existence	of	spatial	autocorrelation	
is	problematic	for	statistical	inference	because	one	or	more	of	its	underlying	assumptions	
is	violated.	Typically,	the	results	of	t‐tests	(the	source	of	significance	indicators)	are	
unreliable	and	the	value	of	the	R2	statistic	is	inflated	(Anselin,	1988).		In	this	study,	
exploratory	spatial	data	analysis	(ESDA)	tools	are	applied	to	test	for	the	presence	of	a	
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detectable	pattern	in	tax	burden	both	within	and	across	jurisdictions.	Linear	and	spatial	
regression	models	supplement	the	ESDA	results	and	allow	the	hypotheses	articulated	in	
the	preceding	chapters	to	be	more	rigorously	tested.	
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	 Chapter	3	
	
METHODOLOGY	
	
Description	of	Research	Design	
	
I	hypothesize	that	Proposition	13	has	had	the	unintended	consequence	of	
exacerbating	the	tax	burden	disparity	between	high	income	persons	and	low	income	
persons	controlling	for	land	use	type.		Specifically,	I	intend	to	show	that	municipalities	in	
San	Diego	County	that	scored	lower	on	a	test	of	fiscal	health	also	exhibited	a	greater	
reliance	on	residential	property	taxes	instead	of	commercial	property	taxes.		Additionally,	I	
will	demonstrate	that	demographic	characteristics	can	be	used	to	predict	municipal	health	
of	a	community	as	well	as	the	level	of	inequity	between	residential	and	commercial	
assessed	property	values	at	both	the	census	tract	and	municipality	levels.	
This	analysis	uses	U.S.	Census	Bureau	information	coupled	with	San	Diego	County	
parcel	data	to	examine	spatial	relationships	between	fiscal	health	and	vertical	equity.		
Spatial	and	standard	statistical	software	were	used	to	clean,	compile,	join,	and	analyze	the	
data.	This	study	also	incorporates	published	city	budgets	and	financial	reports	for	every	
city	in	San	Diego	County	to	assess	the	relative	fiscal	health	of	each	of	those	municipalities.		
	
Variables	
One	of	the	non‐disputed	outcomes	of	the	passage	of	Proposition	13	is	that	California	
and	its	cities	have	significantly	less	property	taxes	in	their	budgets	than	they	did	before	
Proposition	13.		The	municipalities,	school	districts,	and	county	regions	have	found	myriad	
ways	to	generate	revenue	in	the	wake	of	the	loss	of	property	taxes	but	most	are	still	
suffering	fiscal	woes.		Any	existing	fiscal	instability	has	certainly	been	exacerbated	by	the	
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current	economic	recession.		The	dependent	variables	in	this	study	are	municipal	fiscal	
health,	proportion	of	assessed	value	by	land	use	type	residential,	and	proportion	of	
assessed	value	by	land	use	type	commercial,	which	capture	several	dimensions	of	the	
hypothesized	impact	of	Proposition	13.			
Additionally,	previous	studies	have	shown	that	Proposition	13	has	exacerbated	the	
lack	of	equitable	share	of	the	tax	roll	between	land	use	types.		The	data	is	consistent	
throughout	the	state:	in	virtually	every	county,	the	share	of	the	property	tax	borne	by	
residential	property	has	increased	since	the	passage	of	Proposition	13	in	1978,	while	the	
share	of	the	property	tax	borne	by	non‐residential	property	has	decreased.	
There	has	also	been	no	evidence	of	a	shift	in	any	of	the	counties	at	any	level	of	
significance.		Again,	the	data	is	consistent	when	viewed	from	various	angles,	but	differing	
approaches	only	led	to	marginal	fluctuations	in	the	numbers	and	did	not	affect	the	obvious	
trends.		Even	in	instances	where	employment	growth—an	indication	of	the	
commercial/industrial	sector—outstripped	residential	population	growth,	as	it	did	in	
many	counties,	the	burden	still	shifted	away	from	non‐residential	property,	as	it	did	in	San	
Diego	despite	limited	population	growth	and	substantial	employment	growth	(McCarty,	
2011).			So	the	answer	to	the	larger	question	of	how	the	burden	of	the	property	tax	has	
changed	in	the	last	30	years	is	that	it	has	shifted	markedly	away	from	the	commercial	
sector	and	towards	the	residential	sector.	
	The	independent	variables,	or	predictors	used	in	this	study	are	primarily	measures	
of	prosperity.		In	general,	measures	of	wealth,	income,	and	employment	are	indicative	of	
healthy	locations	(Reese	2011,	Isserman	2009).		Building	on	this	foundation,	census	tracts	
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that	exhibit	higher	levels	of	prosperity	using	these	indicators	are	also	expected	to	show	
fiscal	health	at	the	community	level	(Reese,	2011).		What	constitutes	a	healthy,	wealthy	or	
prosperous	community	is	a	subject	of	debate—as	there	are	many	ways	that	prosperity	can	
be	measured.		In	an	exploration	of	rural	prosperity,	Isserman	et.	al.	(2009)	developed	an	
index	that	bases	prosperity	on	four	factors—the	unemployment	rate,	the	high	school	
dropout	rate,	poverty	rate,	and	the	presence	of	certain	housing	conditions	within	the	
county.		Similarly,	comprehensive	analyses	of	urban	areas	often	consider	the	following	
among	the	dimensions	of	a	healthy	community:	education,	safety,	adequate	housing,	
meaningful	work,	and	access	to	health	care.			
Measuring	the	prosperity	of	a	census	tract,	city	or	region	is	not	clear	cut.		In	
economic	models	prosperity	is	typically	captured	by	income	and	job	creation.		For	this	
analysis,	a	combination	of	indicators	was	chosen	that	represent	both	rural	and	urban	
prosperity	measurement,	informed	by	the	availability	of	census	data.		Four	basic	
dimensions	of	prosperity	are	considered	here:	employment,	housing,	education,	and	
marital	status.	Table	4	at	the	end	of	this	chapter	presents	the	full	list	of	variables	as	well	as	
their	derivation.		In	the	employment	dimension	the	measures	used	were	unemployment,	
families	below	poverty	level,	and	four	categories	of	income	representative	of	San	Diego	
County.		In	the	housing	dimension,	ten	variables	were	considered	including:	renter	
occupied,	percent	of	income	spent	on	rent,	differing	levels	of	home	value	(low	and	high	for	
San	Diego	County),	and	vacant	housing	units.		For	the	education	dimension,	the	measures	
used	were	adults	with	less	than	high	school	education,	and	adults	with	a	bachelor’s	degree.	
Marital	status	contains	only	one	variable,	married	persons	above	the	age	25.	
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Tables	1,	2,	and	3	show	the	most	current	figures	available	for	unemployment,	high	
school	completion,	and	homeownership	among	different	racial	groups	from	the	2010	
United	States	Census.		In	2010,	the	unemployment	rate	in	the	United	States	was	8.7	percent	
for	white‐non	Hispanic	Americans,	but	15.8	and	12.9	respectively	for	African	Americans	
and	Hispanic	Americans.		Likewise	the	homeownership	rate	for	white‐non	Hispanics	was	
74.4	percent.		Hispanic	Americans	lagged	significantly	behind	at	47.5	percent	as	do	African	
Americans	at	45.4	percent.		Additionally,	"Racial	and	Ethnic	Residential	Segregation	in	the	
United	States:	1980‐2010”,	a	report	published	by	the	U.S.	Census	bureau	indicates	that	
indices	measuring	racial	segregation	throughout	the	U.S.	show	that	communities	have	
increasingly	segregated	(2011).		Noting	that	communities	of	color	continue	to	lag	behind	
whites	in	these	indicators	of	prosperity,	and	increased	spatial	segregation	by	race,	race	was	
also	included	as	a	variable.	
As	previously	mentioned,	there	was	a	shift	in	the	property	tax	burden	from	a	more	
equal	division	between	residential	and	commercial	property	owners,	to	a	marked	decrease	
in	the	burden	on	commercial	property	in	California	since	the	passage	of	Proposition	13.		In	
order	to	capture	the	effect	of	land	use	assessed	value,	especially	in	commercial	and	
residential	properties,	the	remaining	indicators	are	total	assessed	value	of	the	ten	different	
land	use	type	as	indicated	by	land	use	zone	in	San	Diego	County.		
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Table	1:	U.S.	Unemployment	Rates	By	Race	
		 Dec	2007	 Dec	2010	
White	(non‐Hispanic)	 4.2	 8.7	
Black	(non‐Hispanic)	 8.6	 15.8	
Hispanic	 5.8	 12.9	
Asian	 3.7	 7.3	
U.S.	Total	 4.6	 9.1	
	 	 	
TABLE	2:	U.S.	Homeownership	Rates	by	Race	and	Ethnicity	of	
Householder	
		 2006	 2007 2008 2009 2010
U.S.	total	 68.8%	 68.1% 67.8% 67.4% 66.9%
White,	total	 72.6	 72.0	 71.7	 71.4	 71.0	
White,	non‐Hispanic	 75.8	 75.2	 75.0	 74.8	 74.4	
Black,	total	 47.9	 47.2	 47.4	 46.2	 45.4	
American	Indian	 58.2	 56.9	 56.5	 56.2	 52.3	
Asian	or	Pacific	Islander	 60.8	 60.0	 59.5	 59.3	 58.9	
Hispanic	 49.7	 49.7	 49.1	 48.4	 47.5	
Non‐Hispanic	 71.2	 70.5	 70.3	 69.8	 69.4	
NOTE:	The	homeownership	rate	is	the	percentage	of	home	owning
households	among	all	households	in	the	given	demographic	group.	
Source:	U.S.	Census	Bureau.	Web:	www.census.gov.	
	
TABLE	3:	High	School	dropout	rates	of	16	through	24	year‐olds,	by	
race/ethnicity:	October	2000	through	October	2010	
		 		 Race/Ethnicity		
Year	 Total	 White												
(non‐Hispanic)	
Black														
(non‐Hispanic)	
Hispanic
2000	 10.9	 6.9	 13.1	 27.8	
2001	 10.7	 7.3	 10.9	 27.0	
2002	 10.5	 6.5	 11.3	 25.7	
2003	 9.9	 6.3	 10.9	 23.5	
2004	 10.3	 6.8	 11.8	 23.8	
2005	 9.4	 6.0	 10.4	 22.4	
2006	 9.3	 5.8	 10.7	 22.1	
2007	 8.7	 5.3	 8.4	 21.4	
2008	 8.0	 4.8	 9.9	 18.3	
2009	 8.1	 5.2	 9.3	 17.6	
  
Source:	U.S.	Census	Bureau.	Web:	www.census.gov.	
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Description	of	Materials	and	Instruments	
	
To	analyze	the	spatial	relationship	between	these	variables,	I	estimated	an	ordinary	
least	squares	(OLS)	regression	model	testing	for	the	hypothesized	relationship	between	
fiscal	health	and	vertical	inequity	in	the	tax	base.		The	first	model	used	municipal	fiscal	
health	as	the	dependent	variable.		The	hypothesis	is	that	cities	that	exhibit	distorted	equity	
among	properties	will	also	score	lower	in	the	fiscal	analysis.		A	second	model	used	the	ratio	
of	residential	to	commercial	tax	burden	(a	measure	of	vertical	equity),	as	the	dependent	
variable.		The	central	hypothesis	being	tested	here	is	that	demographic	prosperity	indices	
such	as	income,	education,	and	homeownership	are	related	to	greater	levels	of	inequity	
throughout	the	county.	
The	first	component	of	the	analysis	was	to	contrast	the	fiscal	health	of	
municipalities	in	San	Diego	County,	California	with	the	proportion	of	their	property	tax	
revenue	that	comes	from	residential	versus	commercial	properties	(i.e.,	the	ratio	
mentioned	above).		Commercial	properties	in	San	Diego	County	have	a	higher	average	
value	than	residential	properties	and	thus,	should	be	paying	a	higher	tax	rate	in	order	to	be	
consistent	with	the	vertical	equity	ideal.		The	second	component	of	the	analysis	evaluated	
San	Diego	County	by	census	tract,	comparing	tract‐level	tax	burden	inequity	(i.e.,	which	
tracts	show	a	higher	relative	residential	tax	burden)	to	other	demographic	characteristics	
(renting	versus	owning,	income	level,	etc.).	
The	municipal	and	county	level	financial	records	were	obtained	from	a	variety	of	
sources	including	each	municipality’s	published	fiscal	year	2010‐2011	financial	budgets,	
Consolidated	Annual	Financial	Reports	(CAFR),	and	the	U.S.	Census	Bureau’s	Census	of	
Governments.		Assessed	value	of	each	parcel	in	San	Diego	County	was	obtained	from	the	
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County	of	San	Diego	Assessor’s	office	and	additional	geographic	datasets	for	use	in	
mapping	and	spatial	analysis	(e.g.,	state,	county,	and	municipal	boundaries)	were	obtained	
from	the	San	Diego	Geographic	Information	Source	(SanGIS)	and	the	U.S.	Census	
TIGER/Line	Data	Base.	
	
ArcGIS:	ArcGIS	is	a	geographic	information	system	designed	for	managing	and		
analyzing	data	with	spatial	components.		Its	functions	are	vast	and	range	from	basic	
mapping	to	manipulating	large	databases	of	spatial	information.		The	majority	of	the	
analysis	performed	here,	including	the	spatial	data	preparation	and	map	creation,	
was	conducted	using	two	components	of	the	ArcGIS	suite	of	applications:		ArcMap	
and	ArcCatalog.		
	
Open	GeoDa:	Open	GeoDa	is	a	free	software	program	that	supports	a	variety	of	more		
sophisticated	spatial	data	analysis	techniques.		Both	the	exploratory	spatial	data	
analysis	(ESDA)	and	regression	analysis	components	of	the	present	study	were	done	
within	Open	GeoDa.	
	
R:	R	is	a	language	used	in	statistical	and	graphic	computing	and	is	highly	compatible	with		
ArcGIS.		R	was	used	in	this	analysis	in	the	data	preparation	stage,	as	the	size	of	the	
raw	datasets	used	proved	to	be	too	difficult	and	cumbersome	to	process	with	ArcGIS	
alone.		
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City	Budgets	and	Consolidated	Annual	Financial	Reports	(CAFR):	Budget	reports	for	each		
municipality	in	San	Diego	County	were	obtained	and	downloaded	in	the	spring	of	
2011	from	their	respective	city’s	websites.		Though	a	wealth	of	information	is	found	
in	both,	the	projected	2011	budgets	from	each	report	were	used	to	conduct	a	fiscal	
analysis	of	each	city.		The	CAFR	included	debt	and	debt	service	information	used	in	
the	fiscal	analysis	that	was	often	not	present	in	the	annual	budgets.	
	
SanGIS:	SanGIS	is	an	agency	in	San	Diego	County	committed	to	maintaining	a	regional		
geographic	information	clearinghouse	for	the	San	Diego	area.		The	service	is	online	
and	free	to	the	public.		SanGIS	provided	the	full	San	Diego	County	Assessor	Book,	
parcel	shapefile	and	database,	regional	land	and	geographic	shapefiles,	government	
and	taxing	district	shapefiles,	and	U.S.	Census	Bureau	information	in	shapefile	
format.	
	
Government	Finance	Officers	Association	(GFOA):	The	GFOA	is	an	association	of	public		
managers	and	city	financial	officers	that	works	to	identify	and	promote	best	
practices	for	city	management	in	the	U.S.	and	Canada.		The	GFOA	periodically	
compiles	a	database	of	financial	indicators	compiled	from	1500	U.S.	city	financial	
reports.		The	last	database	was	published	in	2006	and	is	available	for	purchase	from	
their	website.		This	database	was	used	to	compare	the	financial	indicators	created	in	
this	analysis	for	each	city	in	San	Diego	County.	
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TABLE	4:	Preparation	of	Variables	for	Ordinary	Least	Squares	Regression
	
VARIABLE	 INDICATOR	CALCULATION	USING	CENSUS	AND	PARCEL	DATA	
Population	Married	 Total	Number	of	Married	Persons/	Total	Population	over	25	
Renter	Occupied		 Total	Renter	Occupied/Total	Housing	Units	
Rent	40‐50%	of	Income	 Total	#	Households	with	Gross	Rent	40‐49%	of	Income/Total	#	of	Rent	Occ.	Households	
Rent	50%	or	more	of	Income	 Total	#	Households	with	Gross	Rent	>	50%	of	Income/Total	#	of	Rent	Occ.	Households	
Housing	Units	Vacant	 Vacant	Housing	Units/Total	Housing	Stock	
Housing	Value	$1	Million		 #	Housing	Units	Valued	at	$1	Million	or	More/Total	Housing	Stock	
Housing	Value	$150,000	 #	Housing	Units	Valued	at	$150,000	or	Less/Total	Housing	Stock	
Unemployment	Rate	 Total	#	of	civilians	Unemployed/Total	Population	over	15		
Income	10k‐14k	 #	of	Households	with	Income	between	10‐14K/Total	Number	of	Households	
Income	35K‐39K	 #	of	Households	with	Income	between	35k‐39k/Total	Number	of	Households	
Income	75K‐99K	 #	of	Households	with	Income	between	75K‐99K/Total	Number	of	Households	
Income	200K	+	 #	of	Households	with	Income	over	200K/Total	Number	of	Households	
Households	Poverty	Level	 #	of	Households	below	the	Poverty	Level/Total	Number	of	Households	
Education	<	High	School	 #	of	Civilians	with		a	Few	Years	of	High	School	or	Less/	Total	Pop.	>	25	
Education	Bachelor’s	Degree	 #	of	Civilians	with	Education	Bachelor's	Degree/Total	Population	>	25	
Hispanic	Population	 Total	Hispanic	Population/Total	Population	
Asian	Population	 Total	Non‐Hispanic	Asian	Population/Total	Population	
Black	Population	 Total	Non‐Hispanic	Black	Population/Total	Population	
Non‐Hispanic	White	Pop.	 Total	Non‐Hispanic	White	Population/Total	Population	
Zone	30	Assessed	Value	 Total	Assessed	Value	of	Parcels	Zoned	30	Single	Family	Residential	
Zone	50	Assessed	Value	 Total	Assessed	Value	of	Parcels	Zoned	50	Restricted	Commercial	
Residential	Assessed	Value	 Total	Assessed	Value	of	Parcels	Zoned	10‐40	Residential	
Zone	60	Assessed	Value	 Total	Assessed	Value	of	Parcels	Zoned	60	Commercial	
Zone	70	Assessed	Value	 Total	Assessed	Value	of	Parcels	Zoned	70	Industrial	
Zone	80	Assessed	Value	 Total	Assessed	Value	of	Parcels	Zoned	80	Agricultural	
Zone	90	Assessed	Value	 Total	Assessed	Value	of	Parcels	Zoned	90	Special/Miscellaneous	
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TABLE	5:	Descriptive	Statistics	of	Independent	Variables	(Census	Tract)		
Measure	 N	=	605	Minimum Maximum Mean	 Std.	Dev.	
EMPLOYMENT	INDICATORS	
Percent	Unemployment	 1.0%	 58.0%	 4.0%	 0.04208	
Percent	Families	in	Poverty	 0.0%	 34.0%	 6.0%	 0.06849	
Percent	Household	Income	$10‐$14K	 0.0%	 41.0%	 5.0%	 0.04085	
Percent	Household	Income	$35‐$39k	 1.0%	 17.0%	 6.0%	 0.02559	
Percent	Household	Income	$75‐$79K	 0.0%	 100.0%	 12.0%	 0.07723	
Percent	Household	Income	>	$200K	 0.0%	 49.0%	 3.0%	 0.05854	
HOUSING	INDICATORS	         
Percent	Rent	Occupied	 0.0%	 100.0%	 43.0%	 0.25957	
Rent	as	50%	or	more	of	Income	 0.0%	 39.0%	 8.0%	 0.06675	
Percent	Owner	Occupied	 0.0%	 100.0%	 56.0%	 0.26048	
Percent	Vacancy	Rate	 0.0%	 21.0%	 3.0%	 0.15385	
EDUCATION	INDICATORS	         
Percent	High	School	Education	or	Less	 0.0%	 26.0%	 9.0%	 0.05492	
Percent	Bachelor's	Degree	 0.0%	 42.0%	 16.0%	 0.09683	
MARRIAGE	INDICATOR	         
Percent	Married	Population	 18.0%	 97.0%	 51.0%	 0.11248	
RACE	INDICATORS	         
Percent	Hispanic	Population	 0.0%	 51.0%	 11.0%	 0.08479	
Percent	Black	Population	 0.0%	 60.0%	 5.0%	 0.06811	
Percent	White	Population	 4.0%	 97.0%	 0.72 	 0.22771	
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Chapter	4	
	
PROCEDURES	
	
Measurement	of	Municipal	Fiscal	Health	
	
	 Unfortunately,	there	is	no	single	established	standard	for	measuring	municipal	fiscal	
health	and	there	is	no	database	that	ranks	U.S.	cities	or	calculates	scores	based	on	their	
respective	fiscal	responsibility.		For	this	analysis,	the	fiscal	health	of	each	municipality	was	
measured	using	a	ten	point	scale	(Brown,	2003)	that	gauges	the	fiscal	health	of	each	city	
relative	to	cities	of	similar	size.		An	actual	measure	of	fiscal	health	can	therefore,	serve	as	a	
dependent	variable	and	support	regression	analysis	of	its	relationship	with	tax	equity	and	
other	demographic	factors.	
Using	Brown	(2003)	as	a	starting	point,	a	measure	of	fiscal	health	that	allows	for	
even‐handed	comparisons	across	jurisdictions	was	derived.	This	analysis	allows	to	
evaluation	of	cities	of	different	sizes	by	comparing	their	fiscal	standing	to	those	of	similar	
size	within	the	GFOA	database.		The	first	step	in	this	analysis	involved	gathering	base	
information	from	each	city’s	budget	and	current	financial	report	including	figures	in	four	
categories:	revenue,	expenditures,	operating	position,	and	debt	structure.		Using	the	
published	budgets	and	CAFR	for	each	municipality,	items	1a‐10a	were	compiled	for	each	
city	and	can	be	found	in	the	appendix	along	with	step	by	step	guidance	of	how	the	ten	
ratios	are	calculated	and	turned	into	a	composite	score	for	each	city.		The	initial	figures	are	
not	calculations,	but	figures	pulled	directly	from	budgets	and	financial	statements.	
	
REVENUE		 	 1a.	Total	Anticipated	Revenue	2010	
	 	 	 	 2a.	Total	Revenue	in	General	Fund	(GF)	
	 	 	 	 2b.	Total	Intergovernmental	Grants	in	General	Fund	
	 	 	 	 3a.	Total	Operating	Transfers	into	General	Fund	
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EXPENDITURE	 	 4a.	Total	Expenditures	minus	Capital	Funds	
	 	 	 	 4b.	Total	Expenditures	
	
OPERATING	POSITION	 5a.	Total	Revenues	
	 	 	 	 5b.	Total	Expenditures	
	 	 	 	 6a.	Unreserved	and	Undesignated	Funds	in	General		
	 	 	 	 7a.	Total	Cash	and	Investments	in	GF	
	 	 	 	 8a.	Total	General	Fund	Liabilities	
	 	 	 	 8b.	Total	General	Fund	Revenues	
	
DEBT	STRUCTURE	 9a.	General	Obligation	Debt	
	 	 	 	 10a.	Total	Expenditures	in	Debt	Service	Fund	
	
The	second	step	was	to	calculate	ten	comparison	ratios	based	on	the	information	in	table	2	
of	the	appendix.			Using	information	given	in	each	government	published	budget,	ratios	are	
calculated	in	the	same	four	categories:	revenue,	expenditure,	operating	position,	and	debt	
structure.			Detailed	tables	of	the	steps	in	the	process	are	available	in	the	appendix.		These	
ratios	are	computed	for	all	local	governments	in	a	state	and	then	divided	into	quartiles.		
Governments	receive	points	for	each	ratio	depending	on	the	quartile	in	which	the	ratio	
falls:	two	points	for	each	ratio	in	the	fourth	quartile	(75	to	100	percentile),	one	point	for	
the	third	quartile	(50	to	75	percentile),	zero	points	for	the	second	quartile	(25	to	50	
percentile)	and	minus	one	for	the	first	quartile	(0	to	25%).		The	ratios	were	calculated	as	
follows	(Brown,	2003).			
REVENUE	
1. 				 	 	 	 Total	Revenue	
																									 	 												Total	Population	
	
2. 																										 Total	General	Fund	Revenue	from	Own	Sources		
																																																																													Total	General	Fund	
	 	
3. 																																	General	Fund	Sources	from	Other	Funds	
																																									Total	General	Fund	Sources	
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EXPENDITURE	
	
4. 																																															Operating	Expenditure	
																																																				Total	Expenditure	
																				OPERATING	POSITION	
	
5. 																																																						Total	Revenue	
																																																				Total	Expenditure	
	
6. 																																							Unreserved	General	Fund	Balance	
																																												Total	General	Fund	Liabilities	
	
7. 																																Total	General	Fund	Cash	and	Investment	
																																										Total	General	Fund	Liabilities	
																			DEBT	STRUCTURE	
	
8. 																																									Total	General	Fund	Liabilities	
																																											Total	General	Fund	Revenues	
	
9. 																																																	Direct	Long	Term	Debt	
																																																						Total	Population	
	
10. 																																																								Debt	Service	
																																																							Total	Revenues	
	
	
Next,	the	comparative	ratios	were	scored	based	on	which	quartile	they	fall	into	
relative	to	other	cities	in	the	GFOA	database	in	2006	and	inflating	the	dollar	values	using	
the	growth	in	the	municipal	cost	index	(MCI)	from	2006	and	2010.		Each	city	is	given	a	
score	of	between	‐1	and	2	based	on	where	in	falls	within	the	quartile	range	for	each	index	
[<	25%	=	‐1,	25‐50%	=	0,	50‐75%	=	1,	>75%	=	2]	on	the	quartile	range	charts	in	Table	12	
and	Table	13	in	the	appendix.		Each	city	is	matched	with	the	appropriate	chart	based	on	
population	size	and	given	a	score	of	minus	one	to	two	for	each	of	the	ten	ratios.	The	ten	
composite	scores	are	then	summed	into	one	total	score	for	each	municipality	(Table	14).		
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The	scores	can	range	from	‐10	to	20	with	an	average	for	12	for	all	cities	listed	in	the	GFOA.		
Brown	describes	a	value	above	12	as	“good”	fiscal	health	and	a	value	over	17	as	“excellent”	
fiscal	health.	
	
Acquisition	of	GIS	Data	Files	
Census	Tract	Income‐Education	Demographics	Shapefile:	Income	and	education		
information	by	population	count	for	each	census	tract.		This	file	includes	175	
attributes	such	as	educational	attainment,	commuting	behavior,	language	spoken	by	
household,	marital	status,	occupation,	and	income.	
	
Census	Tract	Population‐Housing	Demographics	Shapefile:	Population	and	housing		
information	by	population	count	for	each	census	tract	in	San	Diego	County.		This	file	
includes	230	attributes	including	family	size,	racial	demographics,	ownership/rental	
behavior,	housing	stock,	and	population	demographics	by	race	and	age	cohort.	
	
Municipal	Boundary	Shape	Files:	Boundary	files	for	the	19	municipalities	and		
unincorporated	areas	of	San	Diego	County.		The	only	attributes	included	are	the	
shape,	area,	and	name	of	the	municipality	as	follows:	Carlsbad	(CB),	La	Mesa	(LM),	
Lemon	Grove	(LG),	Unincorporated	(CN),	National	City	(NC),	Coronado	(CO),	
Oceanside	(OC),	Chula	Vista	(CV),	Poway	(PW),	Del	Mar	(DM),	San	Diego	(SD),	El	
Cajon	(EC),	San	Marcos	(SM),	Encinitas	(EN),	Solana	Beach	(SO),	Escondido	(ES),	
Santee	(ST),	Imperial	Beach	(IB),	and	Vista	(VS).	
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San	Diego	County	Wide	Parcel	Shapefile:	Legal	information	for	every	land	parcel	in	San	
Diego	County	from	the	San	Diego	County	Assessors	Book.		The	parcel	shapefile	is	
updated	monthly	and	the	version	used	here	was	obtained	in	June	2011.		There	are	
1,098,649	parcels	in	San	Diego	with	57	attributes	including	owners	name	and	contact	
information,	legal	description,	assessed	value,	and	municipal	designation.		It	is	
important	to	note	that	this	parcel	set	does	not	include	census	tract	or	census	block	
designation	information.	
	
Preparation	of	Census	Data	and	Shapefiles	
First,	the	census	tract	population	data	comes	in	two	main	file	types.		The	first	details	
population	and	housing	demographics,	the	second	income	and	education	demographics.		
The	two	file	types	for	the	census	tracts	in	San	Diego	County	were	joined	using	a	simple	
table	join	in	ArcMap	with	the	census	tract	number	serving	as	the	common	key	between	the	
two	attribute	tables.		A	new	shapefile	was	then	created	from	the	joined	tables.		The	next	
step	was	to	join	the	parcel	data	set	to	the	census	data	so	each	parcel	would	be	attached	to	
the	specific	census	tract	it	resides	in.		The	census	table	and	parcel	table	do	not	have	a	
common	key	on	which	to	join	them,	so	a	spatial	overlay	join	was	performed.		The	spatial	
overlay	join	to	combine	the	two	data	sets	was	based	on	the	spatial	characteristics	of	each	
file.		An	overlay	join	uses	the	center	point	of	each	parcel	and	matches	it	to	the	census	tract	
in	which	that	point	falls.		The	resulting	data	set	was	saved	as	a	new	shapefile	to	preserve	
the	linkages	made	via	the	spatial	join.		The	last	step	involved	joining	the	municipal	
boundary	shapefile	to	the	newly	created	shapefile.		Both	the	census	and	parcel	data	sets	list	
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the	municipality	as	an	attribute,	the	final	join	was	conducted	using	the	municipal	code	as	
the	common	key.	
The	second	task	in	preparing	the	census	data	and	shapefiles	for	use	in	the	
regression	analysis	involved	summarizing	count	and	numerical	data	from	the	parcel	level	
to	the	tract	and	city	levels.		The	first	step	here	was	to	determine	the	assessed	values	of	
different	land	use	types	at	the	census	tract	level.		Each	parcel	has	an	attribute	that	lists	the	
assessed	value	of	land,	assessed	value	of	improvements,	and	total	assessed	value.		Using	the	
data	analysis	tools	in	the	attribute	table	of	the	newly	created	shapefile	with	both	census	
and	parcel	attributes,	a	summary	table	was	created	that	added	the	totals	for	the	three	
assessed	values	across	census	tracts.	
	 The	next	step	was	to	create	summary	tables	at	the	municipal	level.	The	summary	
tables	add	together	numerical	counts	present	for	each	parcel	within	the	database.		A	
summary	count	at	the	municipal	level	totals	the	assessed	values	of	every	parcel	within	that	
municipality	to	yield	the	total	assessed	value.		Another	type	of	summary	table	was	created	
to	sum	the	demographic	variables	at	the	municipal	level	as	well.		After	repeated	attempts	to	
create	a	summary	table	at	the	municipal	level,	it	was	determined	that	the	dataset	was	too	
large	to	produce	consistent	results.		To	ensure	accuracy	at	the	municipal	level	the	large	
shapefile	with	both	census	and	parcel	attributes	was	divided	into	its	19	municipal	parts	
(see	IMAGE	1)	using	ArcMap	select	by	attribute	queries	and	the	summary	tables	were	
created	on	these	separate	municipal	files.			Finally,	a	summary	table	was	created	for	the	
assessed	value	of	land,	assessed	value	of	improvements,	and	total	assessed	value	for	each	
municipality.		The	resulting	summary	tables	were	exported	and	combined	in	an	Excel	table,	
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reimported	into	ArcMap,	and	joined	by	municipality	to	the	shapefile	with	both	census	and	
parcel	attributes.	
	 In	order	to	measure	tax	equity	between	land	use	types	the	percentage	of	assessed	
value	per	census	tract	contributed	by	each	land	use	type	must	first	be	calculated.		This	was	
accomplished	via	the	ArcMap	data	table	analysis	tools.		In	the	attribute	table	of	the	
shapefile	with	both	census	and	parcel	attributes	10	new	fields	were	created	representing	
the	ten	general	land	use	types	observed	within	San	Diego	County.		Land	use	zones	
represented	by	both	category	name	and	number.		For	this	analysis,	the	most	general	
classification	available	was	used	and	the	land	use	types	are	un‐zoned	(0),	single	family	
residential	R‐1	(1),	minor	multiple	residential	(2),	restricted	multiple	residential	(3),	
multiple	residential	(4),	restricted	commercial	(5),	commercial	(6),	industrial	(7),	
agricultural	(8),	and	special/miscellaneous	(9).	
The	field	calculator	was	then	employed	to	derive	the	proportion	of	total	assessed	
value	contributed	by	each	of	the	land	use	types	listed	above	using	the	expression:	
	
Total	Assessed	Value	(AV)	Land	Use	X	/	Total	Assessed	Value	All	
	
Additionally,	the	residential	and	commercial	zones	were	combined	to	create	a	ratio	for	
each	using	the	formulas	where	the	numeric	values	correspond	to	the	land	use	codes	
presented	above:	
	
Residential:	(Total	AV1	+	Total	AV2	+	Total	AV3	+	Total	AV4)/Total	AV	All	
Commercial:	(Total	AV5	+Total	AV6)/	Total	AV	All	
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	 Fiscal	health	for	each	municipality	was	derived	from	the	scores	described	above.		
These	scores	were	recorded	in	a	spreadsheet	along	with	the	municipal	name	and	municipal	
code	and	this	information	was	then	imported	into	ArcMap	and	joined	to	the	shapefile	with	
both	census	and	parcel	attributes	using	a	simple	join	with	the	municipal	code	as	the	
common	key.		The	shapefile	was	then	exported	and	saved	with	the	new	data	attached.	
	 Regression	analysis	was	used	to	model	equity	in	land	use	taxation.	Specifically,	the	
tax	ratios	described	above	served	as	the	dependent	variable	with	the	aforementioned	fiscal	
health	scores,	as	well	as	demographic	characteristics,	functioning	as	the	independent	
variables	or	predictors.		Taken	only	as	raw	counts,	the	demographics	have	little	
explanatory	power	when	compared	across	census	tracts	of	varying	sizes	and	populations.		
In	order	to	offset	the	influence	of	variation	in	tract	size,	appropriate	ratios	were	calculated	
for	each	of	the	demographic	characteristics	included	in	the	study.		This	approach	was	
replicated	for	each	of	the	cities	in	San	Diego	County	to	mitigate	the	impacts	of	variations	in	
land	area	and	population.	This	was	accomplished	via	the	ArcMap	data	table	analysis	tools	
for	the	shapefile	with	both	census	and	parcel	attributes	and	for	each	municipal	shapefile.	In	
the	attribute	table	of	the	shapefile	new	fields	were	created	representing	each	of	the	
demographic	variables.		The	field	calculator	was	then	employed	to	create	a	ratio	for	each	of	
the	aforementioned	variables.	The	specific	field	expression	for	each	variable	can	be	found	
in	Table	4.			
Not	all	land	use	types	zoned	in	San	Diego	were	included	in	this	analysis	because	the	
primary	focus	here	is	on	commercial	versus	residential	land	use	types.		Because	there	are	
several	zones	(2,	3,	and	4)	of	residential	type	property	and	two	zones	(5	and	6)	of	
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commercial	property,	these	were	combined	to	create	one	composite	for	both	residential	
and	commercial	properties.		Additionally,	Zone	3	residential	was	separated	from	the	total	
residential	calculation	to	better	isolate	the	effect	of	Single	Family	residential	versus	other	
types	of	residential	property	such	as	multi‐family	residential.		This	strategy	allows	the	
analysis	to	capture	the	non‐uniform	effects	of	residential	density	on	both	equity	and	fiscal	
health.		Land	use	Zone	0	was	not	included	as	un‐zoned	areas	have	little	or	no	monetary	
assessed	value	according	to	the	San	Diego	Parcel	Data	Set.			
	
Demographic	Mapping	
	 Beyond	their	most	basic	role	as	a	descriptive	tool,	maps	are	often	quite	useful	in	
identifying	and	communicating	patterns	and	trends,	especially	when	applied	to	
demographic	data.		The	initial	aim	of	this	analysis	involves	mapping	demographic	
phenomena	that	may	help	explain	why	some	areas	have	a	higher	relative	residential	tax	
assessment	burden	(than	commercial	assessments)	and	also	explain	the	patterns	of	
municipal	fiscal	health	in	San	Diego	County.			This	study	focuses	on	characteristics	that	
were	purely	demographic	in	nature	or	that	are	indicative	of	prosperity.		Prosperity‐related	
measures	included	income,	education,	home	ownership,	and	unemployment.		The	
demographic	characteristics	investigated	were	those	of	age,	race,	language	spoken,	
commuting	behavior,	and	marital	status.			
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IMAGE	2:						Fiscal	Health	by	Census	Tract1 
 
Note	in	Image	2,	that	all	of	the	cities	in	San	Diego	perform	poorly	compared	to	cities	of	
similar	size	within	the	GFOA	database.		It	is	possible	the	California’s	fiscal	stress,	as	
evidenced	by	their	scores,	is	a	result	of	the	limitations	of	the	local	governments	imposed	by	
Proposition	13.		Images	3	through	6,	at	the	end	of	this	chapter,	graphically	highlight	spatial	
relationships	between	how	land	is	zoned	and	its	assessed	value.		One	of	the	major	
questions	this	study	is	asking	is	“Do	those	differences	in	assessment	by	land	use	type	effect	
the	fiscal	health	of	the	communities	to	which	those	assessments	are	levied?”		It	makes	
                                                            
1 In	this	method	of	measurement,	scores	range	from	‐10	to	20.		In	2006	the	average	score	for	a	municipality	in	
the	GFOA	was	12.	
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sense	that	the	images	show	the	eastern	portion	of	San	Diego	County	with	low	assessment	
values	for	both	commercial	and	residential	zones	at	the	area	is	high	desert	and	mostly	
rural.		As	commercial	and	residential	zones	by	far	make	up	the	largest	portion	of	
assessments,	it	is	surprising	to	see	them	inversely	related	on	Images	3	and	4.		Residential	
and	commercial	development	are	found	hand	in	hand	as	being	close	to	consumers	is	often	a	
prime	goal	for	commercial	development.		It	is	possible	that	areas	with	high	residential	
assessment	revenue	are	lax	about	assessments	of	commercial	properties	or	even	that	these	
spatial	relationship	are	based	on	historical	or	transportation	patterns	that	this	study	does	
not	address.		Images	5	and	6	highlight	the	agricultural	and	industrial	hot	spots	that	will	be	
investigated	further	with	regression	analysis.	
Exploratory	Data	Analysis		
	 Exploratory	spatial	data	analysis	(ESDA)	is	a	logical	next	step	after	mapping	the	raw	
data	and	gaining	familiarity	with	general	patterns	observed	in	spatial	datasets.		Using	the	
software,	Open	GeoDa,	a	series	of	scatter	plots	was	created	for	each	dependent	variable,	
census	tract	fiscal	health	score,	percent	of	census	tract	assessed	value	from	residential	land	
uses,	percentage	of	census	tract	assessed	value	from	commercial	land	uses,	and	then	
repeated	at	the	municipal	level.		Open	GeoDa	allows	you	to	choose	an	independent	and	
dependent	variable	from	amongst	the	attributes	in	the	data	table	attached	to	the	shapefile	
and	plots	their	spatial	occurrences	against	each	other.		
	 The	strength	of	spatial	correlation	within	the	data	depends	on	what	weight	matrix	is	
used	to	plot	the	data.		There	are	several	different	kinds	of	weight	matrices,	each	using	a	
different	“formula”	to	calculate	the	relationship	between	a	given	data	point	and	others	
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located	near	it.		Theory	and	the	analyst’s	conceptual	understanding	of	the	spatial	
relationships	being	studied	inform	the	choice	of	weight	matrix,	and	in	the	absence	of	
compelling	arguments	for	a	particular	specification,	the	basic	queen	contiguity	matrix	is	
typically	employed.	The	matrix	in	this	analysis	was	created	from	the	relationship	of	each	
census	tract	to	one	another	and	a	queen	contiguity	matrix	was	used	to	elicit	any	spatial	
patterns	within	the	data.	
Regression	Analysis	with	Open	GeoDa	
	 Regression	analysis	was	used	to	model	the	relationship	between	municipal	fiscal	
health	and	the	independent	variables	discussed	above	within	San	Diego	County.	This	
technique	was	also	used	to	examine	the	determinants	of	the	percentage	of	total	assessed	
value	derived	from	residential	land	uses	at	both	the	census	tract	and	municipal	levels.		
Ordinary	least	squares	(OLS)	regression	is	conducted	in	Open	GeoDa	by	first	opening	a	
shapefile	in	which	the	attributes	represent	candidate	variables	in	the	regression	model.		
For	a	detailed	overview	of	spatial	regression	using	Open	GeoDa,	see	Anselin	(2005).	
Moran’s	I	Exploratory	Spatial	Data	Analysis	with	Open	GeoDa	
	 The	Moran’s	I	statistic	is	a	well‐established	test	for	the	presence	of	spatial	pattern	
within	a	given	set	of	data.		When	applied	to	single	variable	outside	the	regression	context	
the	observed	values	are	compared	with	the	spatially	lagged	version	of	the	same	data	and	
the	statistical	significance	of	the	test	is	established	through	a	random	permutation	
procedure	(Anselin,	2005	p.	134).	Values	close	to	zero	suggest	that	the	data	are	completely	
spatially	random,	positive	values	suggest	positive	spatial	auto‐correlation,	and	negative	
values	suggest	negative	spatial	autocorrelation.	For	example,	if	the	Moran’s	I	statistic	is	
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calculated	for	household	income	at	the	tract	level	and	the	random	permutation	procedure	
indicates	a	statistically	significant	result	(i.e.,	the	associated	p‐value	is	less	than	0.05)	the	
value	of	the	statistic	itself	can	be	interpreted.	A	high	value	suggests	that	like	values	exhibit	
clustering	or	that	high‐income	households	tend	to	be	located	near	other	high‐income	
households	and	low‐income	households	tend	to	be	located	near	other	low‐income	
households.	Conversely,	a	negative	value	indicates	a	different	type	of	pattern	where	low‐
income	households	are	located	near	high‐income	households	and	vice	versa.		
Assumptions	and	Limitations	
	
	 There	are	several	underlying	assumptions	and	limitations	that	bear	mention	here	
with	respect	to	the	analysis.		First,	for	all	appraisal	work	assumes	that	the	valid	sales	used	
in	the	analysis	are	representative	of	the	entire	population.		However,	it	is	known	that	
homes	in	some	market	areas	and	neighborhoods	sell	more	frequently	than	others,	resulting	
in	over‐representation	and	under‐representation	of	parcels	in	the	valid	sales	sample,	
influencing	valuation	of	properties	in	those	locations,	and	possibly	skewing	the	analysis	
results.	
Second,	SanGIS	was	unable	to	provide	time	series	data	on	the	assessed	value	of	the	
land	parcels.		If	these	data	were	available	it	would	be	possible	to	study	both	the	land	use	
types	and	land	use	values	over	time,	perhaps	before	and	after	implementation	of	a	property	
tax	limit,	and	to	more	cleanly	isolate	the	effect	of	these	policy	interventions.		Time	series	
data	would	also	indicate	which	properties	are	turning	over	faster,	which	plays	a	major	role	
in	the	valuation	process	within	the	Proposition	13	context.	
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Third,	appraisal	offices	in	California	vary	in	their	market	value	estimating	process,	
so	the	accuracy	of	the	annually	reported	values	would	be	expected	to	vary	from	county	to	
county	throughout	the	state.	As	a	result	of	this	practice,	properties	sold	have	a	consistently	
higher	market	value	estimate	(AV),	much	closer	to	the	actual	market	value,	than	the	rest	of	
the	properties.		Another	problem	with	the	appraisal	system	is	known	as	sales	chasing		in	
which	appraisal	districts	often	increase	the	appraised	values	of	properties	that	have	
recently	sold	to	their	sales	price,	while	leaving	comparable	properties	unadjusted	
(McCullogh,	2009).		Sales	chasing	is	difficult	to	avoid	because	appraisers	have	knowledge	of	
the	prior	year	sales	prices	when	they	determine	the	current	year	market	value	estimates	
and	that	knowledge	tends	to	influence	the	appraised	values	they	assign	to	the	sold	
properties.		
Fourth,	the	municipal	health	scores	for	the	municipalities	measured	within	this	
study	did	not	show	great	variation	with	all	the	municipalities	in	San	Diego	County	
performing	poorly	in	2011.		A	comparison	of	community	or	many	communities	that	exhibit	
greater	variation	in	the	level	of	municipal	health	might	provide	richer	insights	into	
relationships	between	the	dependent	and	independent	variables.		It	is	likely	that	this	
comparative	analysis	would	have	to	include	municipalities	outside	of	California	because	its	
cities’	fiscal	health	is	inextricably	linked	to	the	state’s	fiscal	health	woes.	
Lastly,	future	analysis	should	focus	on	measuring	vertical	inequity	by	the	date	of	
purchase	of	the	property	as	that	is	the	only	time	the	base	assessed	value	becomes	active	
under	Proposition	13.		The	assumption	is	that	properties	purchased	more	recently	will	face	
a	higher	tax	burden	than	those	purchased	further	in	the	past	and	this	will	provide	more	
compelling	evidence	of	vertical	inequity	within	property	taxation.	
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TABLE	6:	Variable	Hypotheses	and	Scatter	Plot	Results	(CENSUS	TRACT)	for	
Dependent	Variable	Municipal	Fiscal	Health	
	 HYPOTHESIS	
SCATTER	PLOT	
CORRELATION	
EMPLOYMENT	INDICATORS	 		 		
Unemployment	 NEGATIVE	 POSITIVE	
Families	in	Poverty	 NEGATIVE	 POSITIVE	
Household	Income	$10‐$14K	 NEGATIVE	 POSITIVE	
Household	Income	$35‐$39k	 NEGATIVE	 NEGATIVE	
Household	Income	$75‐$79K	 POSITIVE	 NEGATIVE	
Household	Income	>	$200K	 POSITIVE	 NEGATIVE	
HOUSING	 		 		
Percent	Rent	Occupied	 NEGATIVE	 POSITIVE	
Rent	as	50%	or	more	of	Income	 NEGATIVE	 POSITIVE	
Percent	Owner	Occupied	 POSITIVE	 POSITIVE	
Percent	Vacancy	Rate	 NEGATIVE	 POSITIVE	
EDUCATION	 		 		
Percent	High	School	Education	or	Less	 NEGATIVE	 POSITIVE	
Percent	Bachelor's	Degree	 POSITIVE	 POSITIVE	
MARRIAGE	 		 		
Percent	Married	Population	 POSITIVE	 NEGATIVE	
RACE	 		 		
Percent	Hispanic	Population	 NEGATIVE	 POSITIVE	
Percent	Black	Population	 NEGATIVE	 POSITIVE	
Percent	White	Population	 POSITIVE	 NEGATIVE	
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IMAGE	3:							RESIDENTIAL	ZONES	AS	%	OF	TOTAL	ASSESSED	PROPERTY	VALUE	PER	CITY	
 
 
IMAGE	4:						COMMERCIAL	ZONES	AS	%	OF	TOTAL	ASSESSED	PROPERTY	VALUE	PER	CITY	
 
	
Residential Zones Value/Total Assessed Value
Commercial Zones Value/Total Assessed Value
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IMAGE	5:					INDUSTRIAL	ZONE	VALUE	AS	%	OF	TOTAL	ASSESSED	VALUE	PER	CITY	
 
 
 
IMAGE	6:						AGRICULTURAL	ZONE	VALUE	AS	%	OF	TOTAL	ASSESSED	VALUE	PER	CITY	
 
Industrial Zone Value/Total Assessed Value
Agricultural Zone Value/Total Assessed Value  
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Chapter	5 
FINDINGS	
	
	 Vertical	inequity	is	the	presence	of	differences	in	effective	tax	rates	among	groups	of	
properties	or	land	use	types	based	upon	their	relative	value	ranges.	For	example,	if	higher	
priced	homes	as	a	group	have	different	effective	tax	rates	than	lower	priced	homes	as	a	
group,	the	condition	of	vertical	inequity	exists—property	tax	equity	demands	that	all	
homes	have	the	same	effective	tax	rate.		
Calculations	of	assessed	value	by	land	use	type	supported	the	theory	that	vertical	
property	tax	equity	among	land	use	types	exists	in	California	and	is	a	result	of	assessment	
limits	imposed	by	Proposition	13.		In	comparison	to	land	use	values	before	the	
implementation	of	Proposition	13,	there	has	been	a	significant	shift	of	the	property	tax	
burden	towards	residential	properties.		The	residential	property	tax	burden	has	increased	
from	73%	in	1974	(CTRA)		to	83.58%	in	2010—a	2	point	increase	or	10%	increase	in	the	
property	tax	burden	on	residential	property	owners	since	the	passage	of	Proposition	13.		
Over	the	same	period,	the	non‐residential	property	tax	burden	dropped	from	27%	to	
14%—a	2	point	decrease	or	7%	decrease	in	the	property	tax	burden	on	non‐residential	
property	(i.e.	commercial).	
	
Variable	Maps	
	
	 The	first	step	in	a	general	spatial	analysis	is	to	map	variables	from	the	data	to	note	
possible	trends	and	relationships.		Image	2	shows	fiscal	health	score	by	municipality	with	a	
general	trend	of	higher	fiscal	health	south	near	the	border	of	Mexico.		This	is	consistent	
with	the	initial	data	analysis	that	found	fiscal	health	to	correlate	positively	with	low	levels	
of	community	prosperity.	The	general	trend	of	higher	fiscal	health	south	near	the	border	of	
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Mexico	and	east	to	the	coast	may	be	explained	by	the	higher	value	of	property	and	land	of	
all	types	as	you	near	coastal	areas.			
	
Scatter	Plot	Data	Analysis	
	
	 The	OLS	regression	analysis	used	here	carries	an	assumption	of	linearity,	which	
means	that	there	is	a	straight	line	relationship	between	the	independent	variables	and	the	
dependent	variable.		This	assumption	is	important	because	regression	analysis	only	tests	
for	a	linear	relationship	between	independent	and	dependent	variables.		Violations	of	this	
fundamental	assumption	can	often	be	identified	by	examining	a	bivariate	scatterplot	(i.e.,	a	
graph	with	the	independent	variable	on	one	axis	and	the	dependent	variable	on	the	other).	
Each	of	the	dependent	variables	as	plotted	against	the	dependent	variable	for	fiscal	health	
score.		Each	plot	contains	a	trend	line	that	indicates	a	general	relationship	between	the	
plotted	data.		Initial	analysis	of	plots	shows	negative	relationships	between	fiscal	health	
score	with	all	land	use	types	except	industrial	and	miscellaneous	land	use	zones.		One	
interpretation	is	that	the	fiscal	health	score	is	not	as	responsive	to	the	zones	from	with	the	
municipalities	collect	most	of	their	levy	because	they	are	fairly	consistent	from	year	to	
year.	
	 Additionally,	when	plotting	the	census	tract	fiscal	health	score	against	many	
demographic	characteristics,	there	is	an	overwhelmingly	clear	relationship	elucidated	
between	negative	or	positive	prosperity	indices	and	percentage	assessed	value	residential	
or	commercial.		Income	greater	than	$200k,	population	white,	and	population	married	
show	a	steep	negative	slope	in	relationship	to	percentage		assessed	value	commercial	and	
unemployment,	low	income,	and	vacancy	rate	show	a	positive	relationship.		
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	 The	initial	findings	within	the	Moran	scatter	plots	were	generally	surprising.		The	
initial	hypothesis	held	that	positive	prosperity	within	an	index	would	show	higher	levels	of	
fiscal	health,	the	exact	opposite	was	found	in	many	of	the	plots.		The	only	negative	
correlations	with	fiscal	health	were	found	in	household	income	categories	above	$35,000	
(all),	percent	of	population	married,	and	percent	of	population	white.		All	other	indicators	
showed	positively	correlated	relationships	(Table	6).	
Exploratory	Results	
	
	 Images	7‐9	are	multivariate	Moran’s	I	scatter	plots	for	each	of	the	three	dependent	
variables.		In	concert	with	other	exploratory	analyses,	these	images	give	a	glimpse	of	which	
independent	variables	showed	spatially	dependent	patterns	and	reveals	any	extreme	outliers	
within	the	dataset.		A	slope	moving	from	the	top	left	quadrant	to	the	bottom	right	indicates	negative	
spatial	autocorrelation	and	a	slope	moving	from	the	bottom	left	to	the	top	right	indicates	positive	
correlation.		The	steepness	of	the	slope	indicates	the	strength	of	the	spatial	dependence.		The	value	
of	Moran’s	I	for	each	bivariate	plot	is	listed	above	the	image.			
Image	7	showed	evidence	of	positive	spatial	autocorrelation	in	percent	of	population	black,	
percent	of	population	with	a	bachelor’s	degree	and	commercial	assessed	land	value	to	fiscal	health	
score	in	the	population.		Negative	spatial	autocorrelation	is	found	in	plots	of		percent	white	
population,	percent	of	population	married,	and	residential	assessed	value	to	fiscal	health	score.		
Image	8	showed	evidence	of	positive	spatial	autocorrelation	in	percent	white	population,	percent	
owner	occupied,	percent	Hispanic	population	and	families	in	poverty	to	the	total	assessed	value	of	
residential	property	per	census	tract.		Negative	autocorrelation	was	seen	in	the	percentage	of	
parcels	renter	occupied,	but	no	correlation	is	found	in	the	percent	Hispanic	population	to	
residential	assessed	value	plot.		Image	9	showed	evidence	of	positive	spatial	autocorrelation	in	the	
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percent	Hispanic	population	and	percent	of	parcels	renter	occupied	to	total	assessed	value	of	
commercial	property.		Negative	autocorrelation	is	seen	in	percent	white	population	and	percent	of	
parcels	owner	occupied.	
IMAGES	7.1‐7.7	Moran’s	I	Exploratory	Spatial	Data	Analysis	(ESDA)	Scatter	Plots	Comparing	
Fiscal	Health	Score	to	Independent	Variables		
PLOT 7.1: FISCAL HEALTH SCORE TO      PLOT 7.2: FISCAL HEALTH SCORE TO  
BLACK POPULATION          WHITE POPULATION 
 
 
PLOT 7.3: FISCAL HEALTH SCORE TO      PLOT 7.4: FISCAL HEALTH SCORE TO  
PERCENT OF POPULATION WITH BACHELOR’S    POPULATION MARRIED 
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PLOT 7.5: FISCAL HEALTH SCORE TO      PLOT 7.6: FISCAL HEALTH SCORE TO  
ZONE COMMERCIAL ASSESSED VALUE      ZONED RESIDENTIAL ASSESSED VALUE 
 
 
 
IMAGES	8.1‐8.5:		MORAN’S	I	EXPLORATORY	SPATIAL	DATA	ANALYSIS	(ESDA)	SCATTER	
PLOTS	COMPARING	%	OF	ASSESSED	VALUE	PER	TRACT	RESIDENTIALLY	ZONED	TO	CENSUS	
TRACT	DEMOGRAPHICS	
PLOT 8.1: RESIDENTIAL ASSESSED VALUE TO     PLOT 8.2: RESIDENTIAL ASSESSED VALUE TO 
HISPANIC POPULATION          WHITE POPULATION 
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PLOT 8.3: RESIDENTIAL ASSESSED VALUE TO     PLOT 8.4: RESIDENTIAL ASSESSED VALUE TO 
OWNER OCCUPANCY RATE        RENTER OCCUPANCY RATE 
 
 
IMAGES	9.1‐9.6:		MORAN’S	I	EXPLORATORY	SPATIAL	DATA	ANALYSIS	(ESDA)	SCATTER	
PLOTS	COMPARING	%	OF	ASSESSED	VALUE	PER	TRACT	COMMERCIALLY	ZONED	TO	CENSUS	
TRACT	DEMOGRAPHICS 
PLOT 9.1: COMMERCIAL ASSESSED VALUE TO     PLOT 9.2: COMMERCIAL ASSESSED VALUE TO  
HISPANIC POPULATION          WHITE POPULATION 
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PLOT 9.3: COMMERCIAL ASSESSED VALUE TO     PLOT 9.4: COMMERCIAL ASSESSED VALUE TO  
RATE OF FAMILY POVERTY        HOUSEHOLD INCOME $10=$14K 
 
 
PLOT 9.5: COMMERCIAL ASSESSED VALUE TO     PLOT 9.6: COMMERCIAL ASSESSED VALUE TO  
OWNER OCCUPANCY RATE        RENTER OCCUPANCY RATE 
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	 Phenomena	that	are	highly	influenced	by	social	factors	are	generally	difficult	to	
model.		Humans	and	human	systems	are	complex	and	there	are	numerous	variables	that	
are	difficult	or	impossible	to	account	for	and	data	availability	requires	compromise	on	the	
part	of	researchers.		With	these	caveats	in	mind,	the	results	of	the	OLS	regression	analysis	
are	presented	in	Table	7.		The	first	model	shows	that	the	unemployment	and	low	income	
measures	have	a	negative	relationship	with	fiscal	health.		Also,	this	model	echoes	what	is	
also	shown	in	the	other	models;	race	is	the	strongest	predictor	of	both	fiscal	health	and	
assessed	value	by	line	type.		The	assumption	here	is	that	since	race	is	highly	correlated	
with	residential	patterns	(U.S.	Census	Segregation	Pattern),	it	is	not	surprising	that	race	has	
a	strong	spatial	influence.		The	results	of	this	analysis	show	the	regression	model	for	fiscal	
health	score	to	be	the	strongest	with	and	adjusted	R2	value	of	0.27and	a	general	positive	
linear	relationship	with	all	racial	types	and	persons	paying	more	than	50	percent	of	their	
income	towards	rent	(Table	7).		
The	results	of	this	analysis	for	percent	assessed	value	commercial	showed	a	strong	
negative	predictive	value	in	homeownership.		The	measure	for	homeownership	is	more	
likely	to	indicate	single	family	or	residential	only	neighborhoods	which	could	be	more	
likely	to	exclude	zoning	for	commercial	development.		The	model	for	percent	assessed	
value	also	included	population	white,	population	Hispanic,	low	income,	families	in	poverty,	
and	percent	of	persons	with	a	bachelor’s	degree.	The	last	model	shows	percent	assessed	
value	residential	to	have	a	predictive	relationship	most	strongly	with	the	presence	of	
Hispanic	population.		The	model	is	also	accounted	for	by	percent	rent	occupied,	percent	
married,	and	unemployment	(Table	7).		One	conjecture	as	to	why	this	is	so	is	that	higher	
value	properties	(which	link	to	higher	levels	of	prosperity	such	as	income)	are	re‐assessed	
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less	often	than	lower	value	properties	with	the	lower	value	properties	then	contributing	
more	property	tax	to	the	local	levy.		Though	this	says	little	about	the	fiscal	health	of	
communities	in	San	Diego	County,	it	does	begin	to	provide	insight	into	the	relationship	
between	racial	segregation	in	residential	location	patterns	and	land	use	characteristics.	
Fiscal	health,	on	the	other	hand,	has	been	more	difficult	to	model.		It	is	likely	that	including	
political	and	fiscal	decisions		in	a	spatial	model	might	be	more	telling.	The	CFAR	report	
(2010)	found	a	surprising	amount	of	commercial	and	high	value	sales	that	escaped	
assessment.		Another	conjecture	is	that	these	trends	are	evidence	of	the	classic	American	
settlement	patterns	in	which	automobile	dependency,	safety	and	similarity	guide	
residential	choices	of	these	citizens.			
	 The	second	regression	model	takes	municipal	fiscal	health	as	the	dependent	
variable	and	the	key	predictor	is	the	percentage	of	assessed	value	that	comes	from	
different	land	use	types.	The	results	suggest	negative	correlations	between	municipal	fiscal	
health	and	both	residential	and	commercial	percentage	assessed	value	contribution	as	well	
as	a	positive	relationship	between	Special/Misc.	Land	Use	of	Zone	9.		It	should	be	noted	
that	special	or	miscellaneous	land	use	includes	tourist’s	destinations	and	these	uses	bring	
in	large	amounts	of	revenue.			Although	this	result	is	significant,	it	is	perhaps	less	
meaningful	than	the	previously	regressed	variables.		
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TABLE	7:	OLS	Regression	for	3	dependent	variables
Model	1 Model	2 Model	3	
	Predictors	 Coef.	 Std.	Error Coef. Std.	Error Coef. Std.	Error	
Constant	 0.3447	 0.0369** 0.3648 0.0442*** 0.4856 0.0540***	
Population	Black	 0.3194	 0.0640***	
Population	White	 0.4175	 0.2947*	 ‐0.1158	 0.0140*	
Population	Hispanic	 0.3517	 0.0462***	 ‐0.0971	 .0432*	 0.2348	 .0425***	
Income	$10‐$14k	 ‐0.3242	 0.0640***	 0.2925	 .0946**	
Unemployed	 0.6130	 0.1140**	 ‐0.0821	 .0756***	
Rent	>	50	%	Income	 0.0318	 0.0935*	
Homeowners	 ‐0.1514	 .0436***	
Rent	Occupied	 ‐0.117	 .0446**	 ‐0.0579	 .0132***	
Education	Bachelors	 0.0244	 0.0357	
Family	Poverty	 ‐0.1119	 .0631*	
Zone	Commercial	 6.8169	 .90611***	 	 	 	 	 	    
Population	Married	 0.1393	 .0155***	
Model	Summary	
Multicollinearity	[4]	 17.270785	 55.421201 12.543061
Breusch‐Pagan	test	 44.30955***	 38.94422***	 42.2651***	
Adjusted	R2				 0.33	 0.17 0.19
Moran’s	I	[5]	 0.0658***	 0.1192**	 ‐0.5712***	 	    
	*p	<	0.05.		**p	<	0.01.		***p	<	0.001.	
	
	
[1]	The	dependent	variable	is	the	fiscal	health	score	associated	with	each	census	tract	in	the		
study	area.	
[2]	The	dependent	variable	is	the	assessed	value	contributed	by	commercial	uses	for	each	census	
tract	in	the	study	area.	
[3]	The	dependent	variable	is	the	assessed	value	contributed	by	residential	uses	for	each	census	
	tract	in	the	study	area.	
[4]	Values	over	30	are	typically	indicative	of	multicollinearity	issues	and	require	attention.	
[5]	Moran’s	I	tests	for	spatial	dependence	in	the	model	residuals.	
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TABLE	8:	Spatial	Error	Regression	Model	for	3	dependent	variables
	
   Model	1	 Model	2	 Model	3	
	Predictors	 Coef.	 Std.	Error	 Coef.	 Std.	Error	 Coef.	 Std.	Error	
Constant	 0.5228	 0.0277***	 0.3576	 0.0438***	 0.7252	 0.0222***	
Population	Black	 0.002	 1.1817	 		 		
Population	White	 0.36412	 0.0209***	 ‐0.1094	 0.0140***	 		 		
Population	Hispanic	 5.3857	 0.9010***	 ‐0.0956	 0.0435	 0.0648	 0.0316*	
Income	$10‐$14k	 ‐0.58157	 1.9618*	 0.2858	 0.0939*	 		 		
Unemployed	 ‐0.0454	 0.1140**	 ‐0.2029	 0.0846**	
Rent	>	50	%	Income	 0.2355	 1.2371	 		 		
Zone	Commercial	 4.7097	 0.8693***	 		 		
Homeowners	 		 		 ‐0.1461	 0.0433***	 		 		
Rent	Occupied	 		 		 ‐0.1154	 0.0443	 ‐0.0299	 0.0171*	
Education	Bachelors	 		 		 0.0141	 0.0357	 		 		
Family	Poverty	 		 		 ‐0.1036	 0.0680**	 		 		
Population	Married	 		 		 0.0648	 0.0241***	
Lambda	 ‐0.7779	 .1766***	 ‐0.1718	 .2201*	 ‐0.5211	 0.2041**	
Model	Summary	
Breusch‐Pagan	Test	 21.28011*	 196.6537***	 5.81208	
Log	Liklihood	Test	 62.48157***	 0.7425235	 7.227767**	
Adjusted	R2				 0.22	 0.18	 0.08	
	*p	<	0.05.		**p	<	0.01.		***p	<	0.001.	            
	
[1]	The	dependent	variable	is	the	fiscal	health	score	associated	with	each	census	tract	in	the		
study	area.	
[2]	The	dependent	variable	is	the	assessed	value	contributed	by	commercial	uses	for	each	census	
tract	in	the	study	area	
[3]	The	dependent	variable	is	the	assessed	value	contributed	by	residential	uses	for	each	census	
	tract	in	the	study	area.	
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Spatial	Regression	Analysis	(Moran’s	I)	
	
	
	 Exploratory	spatial	data	analysis	shows	patterns	in	the	variables	for	which	you	can	
test	for	spatial	autocorrelation	using	spatial	regression	analysis.		Each	of	the	dependent	
variables	considered	in	the	three	models	exhibit	some	level	of	spatial	auto‐correlation	and	
represents	a	clear	departure	from	the	null	hypothesis	of	complete	spatial	randomness.		
Though	model	one	(fiscal	health)	shows	the	strongest	evidence	for	spatial	dependence	with	
a	statistically	significant	Moran’s	I	value	of	0.5395	when	the	residuals	were	tested,	the	
model	is	problematic	in	that	the	fiscal	health	scores	were	calculated	at	the	municipal	level	
and	then	assigned	to	the	census	tracts	within	the	municipality.		As	a	result,	spatial	
dependence	is	introduced	due	to	this	hierarchical	relationship.		Although	using	the	
municipal‐level	calculations	in	this	way	is	not	ideal,	the	sample	size	at	the	municipal	level	
was	too	small	(n	=	21)	to	garner	dependable	results.		One	way	to	remedy	this	problem	
would	be	to	calculate	fiscal	health	and	test	for	spatial	dependency	of	many	more	
municipalities	within	California,	and	this	is	a	possible	area	for	further	research	at	a	later	
date.		
The	next	step	in	spatial	regression	analysis	according	to	Anselin	(2005)	is	to	
estimate	a	spatial	error	model.		This	step	adjusts	the	standard	errors	in	the	first	model	to	
offset	bias	from	spatial	autocorrelation	in	the	residuals.		The	corrected	models	are	
presented	in	Table	8.		For	comparison	purposes,	the	estimated	model	contains	the	same	set	
of	controls	as	the	first	model	in	Table	7.		The	first	considers	fiscal	health	of	each	census	
tract	as	it	is	affected	by	its	nearest	neighbors	based	on	its	geographical	position.		Two	of	the	
independent	variables	that	were	significant	in	the	OLS	version	of	Model	1	(Population	
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Black,	Rent	>	50%	Income)	lose	significance	when	the	spatial	autocorrelation	is	removed	
(see	Table	8).		Interestingly,	the	unemployment	variable	remains	significant,	but	the	
direction	of	its	relationship	with	fiscal	health	changes	as	evidenced	by	a	shift	in	sign	
between	Table	7	to	Table	8.		Finally,	the	Zone	Commercial	variable	remains	significant	and	
the	sign	is	unchanged,	but	the	associated	coefficient	suggests	a	positive	relationship	
between	commercial	properties	and	fiscal	health.	Specifically,	for	a	one	unit	increase	in	
Zone	Commercial,	the	dependent	variable	(fiscal	health)	of	Model	1	is	expected	to	increase	
by	a	6.8,	which	is	surprising.		This	finding	points	to	a	more	complex	relationship	between	
fiscal	health	and	proportion	of	taxes	levied	from	commercial	to	residential	land	use	than	
was	investigated	in	this	study.		One	common	rule	of	economic	growth	and	stability	for	
municipalities	is	diversity	within	revenue	sources,	including	from	the	tax	base.		Another	
explanation	would	be	that	increased	presence	of	commercial	zoned	parcels	increases	the	
amount	of	sales	tax	revenue	of	the	municipality,	thus	the	fiscal	health.	
In	Table	7,	spatial	autocorrelation	is	also	strongly	exhibited	by	Model	3	where	total	
residential	land	assessed	value	is	the	dependent	variable	with	a	Moran’s	I	value	of	‐0.5712,	
it	remains	statistically	significant.		This	dependent	variable,	in	particular,	is	very	difficult	to	
statistically	model	and	may	show	spatial	dependence	due	to	omitted	variables	where	
supporting	data	were	unavailable,	and	therefore	could	not	be	included	at	this	point.		The	
spatial	relationships	that	exist	show	that	percent	rent	occupied	and	percent	of	persons	
unemployed	are	negatively	associated	with	residential	assessed	value	in	space.		The	
commercial	assessed	value	model	shows	very	little	spatial	autocorrelation	with	a	Moran’s	I	
value	of	0.1192.		One	explanation	is	that	commercial	property	is	less	predictable	than	
residential	property	and	the	relatively	poor	performance	of	the	model	(R2	=	0.17)	simply	
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reflects	a	less	mature	theoretical	understanding	of	these	properties,	relative	to	residential	
properties.		The	monetary	assessed	value	of	residential	property	is	highly	dependent	on	
location,	as	in	a	high	income	neighborhood	versus	a	low	income	neighborhood.		In	contrast,	
commercial	property	is	more	flexible	in	terms	of	assessed	value.		For	example	one	may	find	
a	big	box	store	(high	value)	located	in	a	low	income	neighborhood	or	a	specialty	small	
business	with	one	office	(lower	value)	in	a	high	income	neighborhood.	
Summary	
	
	 The	findings	indicate	that	there	is	a	significant	relationship	between	factors	of	
prosperity,	municipal	fiscal	health,	and	proportion	of	assessed	land	value	by	use	type.		In	
San	Diego	County,	municipal	fiscal	health	score	is	directly	related	to	census	tracts	in	which	
the	commercial	tax	burden	is	higher.		One	postulation	is	that	increased	diversity	in	the	tax	
base,	as	evidenced	by	a	larger	share	of	taxes	from	commercially	zoned	parcels,	has	helped	
slow	the	negative	fiscal	effects	as	compared	to	cities	with	large	swaths	of	residential	only	
land	use.		Residentially	zoned	parcels	are	paying	a	greater	relative	burden	of	the	tax	levy	
for	every	community	in	San	Diego	County	relative	to	that	position	pre	1978		(CAL).		One	
explanation	often	put	forward,	that	housing	turns	over	more	rapidly	than	commercial	
property,	does	not	fully	explain	the	phenomenon,	as	much	research	notes	that	turnover	
rates	tend	to	equalize	over	time	(O’Sullivan,	1995).		It	is	more	likely	that	commercial	
property	is	not	as	frequently	reassessed	as	homeowner	property,	but	commercial	property	
frequently	changes	ownership.		The	problem	is	that	an	assessment	is	not	often	triggered,	
and	that	“a	change	in	ownership”	only	occurs	under	limited	circumstances.		Additionally,	
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these	residential	versus	commercial	inequity	patterns	can	be	explained,	spatially,	through	a	
host	of	demographic	characteristics	present	within	the	community.	
	 The	findings	also	indicate	that	the	cities	in	San	Diego	County	are	fiscally	strained	in	
comparison	to	cities	of	similar	size	throughout	the	United	States.		Using	the	ten	point	fiscal	
analysis,	all	cities	in	San	Diego	scored	a	six	or	below,	with	a	ten	being	a	“good”	score	for	
comparable	cities.		Though	this	study	does	not	elaborate	on	the	causes	of	the	fiscal	strain	in	
San	Diego	County,	it	does	show	that	demographic	characteristics	can	be	used	to	predict	the	
financial	health	of	communities	in	San	Diego	County.	
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Chapter	6	
Conclusions	and	Recommendations	
	
	
Conclusions	
	
	 The	results	of	the	analysis	provide	evidence	that	assessment	capping	has	had	the	
undesirable	result	of	damaging	property	tax	fairness	among	taxpayers	in	San	Diego	County.	
This	work	also	further	supports	the	basis	for	legal	challenges	to	the	constitutionality	of	
assessment	capping.	
The	research	questions	were:		(a)	to	what	extent	is	municipal	fiscal	health	in	San	
Diego	County	predicted	by	disparities	in	assessed	value	by	land	use	types	in	San	Diego	
County	and	(b)	are	disparities	in	assessed	value	by	land	use	types	in	San	Diego	County	
predicted	by	economic	and	demographic	variables	that	indicate	prosperity?		The	
conclusion	and	answer	to	the	first	research	question,	based	upon	the	results	reported	in	
this	analysis,	is	that	there	is	a	significant	correlation	between	variables	of	demographic	
affluence,	such	as	percent	of	population	married	and	homeownership,	and	an	increased	
reliance	on	residential	properties	to	support	the	local	tax	levies.		Additionally,	there	is	
evidence	that	a	census	tracts	fiscal	health	score	is	higher	when	that	tract	shows	a	higher	
percentage	of	property	taxes	from	commercial	land	use,	even	though	San	Diego	County	has	
experienced	a	downward	shift	in	the	amount	of	commercial	taxes	levied	since	the	passage	
of	Proposition	13	in	1978	(CTRA).		The	answer	to	the	second	question	is	that	yes,	
demographic	and	spatial	variables	correlate	to	levels	of	commercial	to	residential	property	
tax	fairness	in	San	Diego	County.	
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The	strongest	model	found	in	this	study,	though,	was	the	ability	to	predict	municipal	
fiscal	health	from	the	independent	variables	such	as	white	population,	Hispanic	population,	
black	population,	unemployment,	low	income,	and	paying	too	much	for	rent.		The	
demographic	model	points	to	a	relationship	between	patterns	of	racial	segregation	in	
residential	location	and	indices	of	prosperity.	
Recommendations	
I	recommend	that	measures	be	taken	to	improve	property	tax	equity.		The	results	of	
this	study	have	provided	evidence	that	Proposition	13,	as	a	means	of	limiting	property	
taxes,	actually	reduces	tax	equity	among	the	taxpayers	that	the	policies	are	intended	to	
benefit.		The	very	first	thing	Californians	must	do	is	to	call	for	legislation	that	reassesses	
many	or	all	commercial	properties	in	order	to	avoid	basic	cuts	in	services	and	programs.		
There	appear	to	be	many	millions	of	dollars	in	tax	revenue	which	are	going	uncollected	due	
to	missed	assessments	and	loop	holes	in	the	law	that	allows	for	transference	of	property.		
Second,	the	existing	law	should	be	changed	to	ensure	that	obvious	changes	of	ownership,	
such	as	private	equity	buyouts	and	corporate	takeovers,	trigger	a	reassessment	for	all	
commercial	properties	automatically.	
As	for	long	term	effects,	one	recommendation	is	to	eliminate	tax	administration	
policies	and	return	equity	to	property	taxation	throughout	California	by	eliminating	
assessment	limits	for	commercial	properties.		For	whatever	reason,	commercial	properties	
are	able	to	avoid	reassessment	as	often	as	residential	properties	resulting	in	a	significantly	
lower	tax	burden	in	most	areas	of	San	Diego	County.	
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	It	is	highly	unlikely	that	such	action	is	possible	legislatively	due	to	the	potential	
political	costs	associated	with	their	elimination	or	by	popular	vote	because	the	perception	
held	by	the	majority	of	voters	is	that	Proposition	13	benefits	them.	Hence,	the	only	feasible	
means	of	returning	property	taxation	to	a	true	market	value	standard,	which	is	the	only	
manner	by	which	it	will	function	equitably	for	all	taxpayers,	is	through	the	courts	using	the	
evidence	produced	by	findings	in	this	and	other	studies	that	examine	equity	in	relation	to	
taxable	net	assessed	value.	
Another	recommendation	is	to	provide	a	property	tax	circuit‐breaker	provision	of	
the	variety	described	in	detail	by	Bowman	(2008)	that	has	an	income‐based	need	test,	
providing	an	inverse	relationship	between	household	income	and	tax	relief	amounts	for	
those	needing	assistance.			Programs	based	upon	the	circuit‐breaker	concept	would	offer	a	
means	of	providing	legitimate	tax	relief	for	the	small	number	of	homeowners	truly	in	need	
of	assistance,	and	as	such,	should	have	minimal	equity	impact	for	taxpayers.	
A	method	shown	to	work	effectively,	even	in	the	presence	of	citizen	apathy,	is	to	
statutorily	require	an	automatic	rate	reduction	to	enforce	revenue	growth	limits	after	the	
aggregate	assessed	value	has	been	determined.		Kentucky	is	an	example,	where	statutes	
limited	total	property	tax	revenue	growth	to	a	maximum	of	4%	per	year	irrespective	of	the	
amount	that	real	estate	assessments	increased,	by	requiring	that	tax	rates	be	reduced	as	
necessary	to	limit	revenue	growth	(Coffman,	1993).		During	the	period	of	1978	to	1992,	
when	state‐wide	assessed	property	value	increased	273%,	state‐wide	property	tax	revenue	
only	increased	by	60%,	which	was	the	4%	maximum	allowed	annual	revenue	increase	
compounded	over	the	14	year	period	(Coffman,	1993,	p.	111).		The	public	has	accepted	the	
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myth	of	assessment	increases	as	the	cause	of	rapid	property	tax	increases	and	has	
demanded	assessment	capping	as	the	cure.	Instead,	a	more	effective	and	equitable	
response	would	be	to	use	mandatory	year‐to‐year	revenue	capping	to	control	property	tax	
increases.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
67	
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY	
Anderson,	T.	and	Sousa,	R.	2009.	Reacting	to	the	Spending	Spree:	Policy	Changes	We	Can	
Afford.	Hoover	Institution	Press:	Stanford,	California.	
Anselin,	L.	1988.	Spatial	Econometrics:	Methods	and	Models.	Dordrecht,	The	Netherlands:	
Kluwer.	
Anselin,	Luc.	2005.	Exploring	Spatial	Data	with	Open	GeoDA:		A	workbook.	
Benson,	E.D.	and	A.L.	Schwartz.	1997.	Vertical	equity	in	the	taxation	of	single‐family	homes.	
Journal	of	Real	Estate	Research.	14	(3):	pp.	215‐231.	
Birch,	J.,	Sunderman,	M.,	and	Smith,	B.	2004.	“Vertical	Equity	in	Property	Taxation:	A	
Neighborhood	Analysis”.		Journal	of	Real	Estate	Finance	and	Economics.	29(1):	pp.	71‐78	
Bivand,	Roger	S.,	Pebesma,	Edzer	J.,	Gómez‐Rubio,	Virgilio.	2008.		Applied	Spatial	Data	
Analysis	with	R.	Springer,	New	York.	
Borst,	R.	and	McClusky,	W.	2008.	Using	Geographically	Weighted	Regression	to	Detect	
Housing	Submarkets:	Modeling	Large‐Scale	Spatial	Variations	in	Value.		Journal	of	Property	
Tax	Assessment	and	Administration.	5(1):	pp.	21‐54	
Brown,	K.	1993.	The	10‐Point	Test	of	Financial	Condition:	Toward	and	Easy‐to‐Use	
Assessment	Tool	for	Smaller	Cities.	Government	Finance	Review.	6(1):	pp.	21‐26	
California	Tax	Reform	Association.	2010.	System	Failure:	California’s	loophole	ridden	
Commercial	Property	Tax.	Alliance	for	California	Community	Empowerment,	California.	
Chapin,	T.	2002.	Beyond	the	Entrepreneurial	City:	Municipal	Capitalism	in	San	Diego.	
Journal	of	Urban	Affairs:	24(5),	pp.	565‐581	
Chica‐Olmo	J.	2007.		Prediction	of	housing	location	price	by	a	multivariate	spatial	method:	
cokriging.	J	Real	Estate	Res	29(2):	pp.	233–254	
Coffman,	J.	F.	1993.	House	Bill	44:	Kentucky’s	version	of	property	tax	limitation.	
Proceedings	of	the	59th	annual	conference	of	the	International	Association	of	Assessing	
Officers,	Chicago,	59,	pp.	108‐115.	
Cornia,	G.	and	Slade,	B.	2005.	Property	Taxation	of	Multi‐Family	Housing:	An	Empirical	
Analysis	of	Vertical	and	Horizontal	Inequity.	Journal	of	Real	Estate	Research,	Winter	2005.	
Craw,	M.	2008.	Taming	the	Local	Leviathan:	Institutional	and	Economic	Constraints	on	
Municipal	Budgets.	Urban	Affairs	Review	2008:	43,	p	663	
68	
 
Dingemans,	D.	And	Munn,	A.	1989.	Acquisition‐Based	Assessment	and	Property	Tax	
Inequalities	after	California's	1978	Proposition	Thirteen.	Growth	and	Change:	20(1),	pp.	55‐
66	
Dubin,	RA	.	1992.	Spatial	autocorrelation	and	neighborhood	quality.	Regional	Science	and	
Urban	Economics	22:433–452	
Einhorn,	R.	2006.		American	Taxation,	American	Slavery.	University	of	Chicago	Press:	
Chicago	
Elliot,	D.	A	Better	Way	to	Zone:	Ten	Principles	to	Create	More	Livable	Cities.	Island	Press:	
Washington,	DC	
Ely,	J.	W.	1992.	The	guardian	of	every	other	right:	A	constitutional	history	of	property	
rights.	NY:	Oxford	University	Press.	
Fischel,	W.	A.	2001.	The	homevoter	hypothesis:	How	home	values	influence	local	
government	taxation,	school	finance	and	land	use	policies.	Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	
University	Press.	
Fischer,	G.	1996.	The	Worst	Tax?	A	History	of	the	Property	Tax	in	America.	University	Press	
of	Kansas:	Lawrence,	Kansas.	
Galles,	G.	and	Sexton	R.	1998.	A	tale	of	two	tax	jurisdictions:	The	surprising	effects	of	
California's	Proposition	13	and	Massachusetts'	Proposition	2	½.	American	Journal	of	
Economics	and	Sociology:	57(2),	pp.	123‐34	
Goodchild,	M	and	Janelle,	D.	2004.		Spatially	Integrated	Social	Science.	Oxford:	Oxford	
University	Press.	
Harris,	R.	Lehman,	M.	2001.	Social	and	geographic	inequities	in	the	residential	property	tax:	
a	review	and	case	study.	Environment	&	Planning	A:	Vol.	33	Issue	5,	p	881	
Hoene,	C.	2004.	Fiscal	Structure	and	the	Post	Proposition	13	Fiscal	Regime	in	California’s	
Cities.		Public	Budgeting	and	Finance.	Winter	2004,	pp.	51‐72	
Honadle,	B.,	Costa,	J.	and	Cigler,	B.	2004.		Fiscal	Health	for	Local	Governments:	An	
Introduction	to	Concepts,	Practical	Analysis,	and	Strategies.	US:	Elsevier	Academic	Press.	
Hwang,	B.	Hu,	B.	and	Barry,	M.	2010.	Geographically	and	temporally	weighted	regression	
for	modeling	spatio‐temporal	variation	in	house	prices.		International	Journal	of	
Geographical	Information	Science,	24:	3,	pp.	383‐401	
Isserman,	A.,	Feser,	E.,	and	Warren,	D.	2009.	Why	Some	Rural	Places	Prosper	and	Others	Do	
Not.	International	Regional	Science	Review:	32(3),	pp.	300‐342	
69	
 
Kousser,	T.	McCubbins,	M.	Moule,	E.	2010.		For	Whom	the	TEL	Tolls:	Can	State	Tax	and	
Expenditure	Limits	Effectively	Reduce	Spending?	State	Politics	&	Policy	Quarterly;	Vol.	8	
Issue	4,	pp.	331‐361	
Lo,	C.	1990.	Small	Property	versus	Big	Government:	Social	Origins	of	the	Property	Tax	
Revolt.		University	of	California	Press:	Berkeley.	
Martin,	W.	and	Citrin,	J.	Eds.	2009.	After	the	Tax	Revolt:	California’s	Proposition	13	turns	30.	
Institute	of	Governmental	Studies	Press.	
McCarty,	L.	2011.	The	Fairness	of	Proposition	13.Tax	Foundation	Research.		
McMillen,	D.	2003.		Spatial	Autocorrelation	or	Model	Misspecification?	International	
Regional	Science	Review	26(2):	pp.	208‐217	
Myers,	D.	2009.	The	Demographics	of	Proposition	13:	Large	Disparities	Between	the	
Generations	and	the	Unsustainable	Effects	of	House	Prices.	USC	Population	Dynamics	
Research	Group.	USC	School	of	Policy,	Planning,	and	Development.	2009.		
Mullins,	D.	and	Wallin,	B.	2004.	Tax	and	Expenditure	Limitations:	Introduction	and	
Overview.	Public	Budgeting	and	Finance.	Winter	2004,	pp.	1‐15	
Musgrave,	R.	A.	1959.	The	theory	of	public	finance:	A	study	in	public	economy.	NY:	
McGraw‐Hill.	
Nagle,	N.	2009.	Spatial	Linear	Regression	from	Census	Microdata:	Combining	Microdata	
and	Small	Area	Data.		Environment	&	Planning	A:	41	(9),	pp.	2215‐2231	
Reese,	L	and	Ye,	M.	2011.	Policy	Versus	Place	Luck:	Achieving	Local	Economic	Prosperity.	
Economic	Development	Quarterly:	25(3),	pp.	221‐236.	
Oates,	W.	Eds.	2001.	Property	Taxation	and	Local	Government	Finance.	Lincoln	Institute	of	
Land	Policy:	Cambridge,	Massachusetts.	
Ornstein,	A.	2007.	Class	Counts:	Education,	Inequality,	and	the	Shrinking	Middle	Class.	
Rowman	and	Littlefield	Publishers	Inc:	Lanham,	Maryland.	
O'Sullivan,	A.,	Sheffrin,S.		and	Sexton,	T.		1995.	Property	Taxes	and	Tax	Revolts:	The	Legacy	
of	Proposition	13.	New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press	
O'Sullivan,	A.;	Sexton,	T.;	Sheffrin,	S.	1994.	Differential	Burdens	from	the	Assessment	
Provisions	of	Proposition	13.	National	Tax	Journal:	v.	47(4),	pp.	721‐29	
70	
 
Sexton,	G.	Hoene,	C.,	and	Erie,	S.		Fiscal	Constraints	and	the	Loss	of	Home	Rule:	The	Long‐
Term	Impacts	of	California’s	Post‐Proposition	13	Regime.	The	American	Review	of	Public	
Administration	2002;	32;	423	
Schwartz,	J.	1998.	Prisoners	of	Proposition	13:	Sales	Taxes,	Property	Taxes,	and	the	
Fiscalization	of	Municipal	Land	Use	Decisions;	71	S.	Cal.	L.	Rev.	183	(1997‐1998)	
Sexton,	Teri.	2010.	"Proposition	13:	Unintended	Effects	and	Feasible	Reforms".	National	
Tax	Journal.	FindArticles.com.	12	Mar,	2010.	
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb3356/is_1_52/ai_n28729539/	
Sirmans	et	al.	2008.	Horizontal	and	vertical	inequity	in	real	property	taxation.	Journal	of	
Real	Estate	Literature.	16	(2):	167‐180	
Smith,	A.	1776.	An	inquiry	into	the	nature	and	causes	of	the	wealth	of	nations	[reprint	
edition,	Harvard	Classics,	1985].	Danbury,	CT:	Grolier.	
Smith,	B.	2008.	Intrajurisdictional	Segmentation	of	Property	Tax	Burdens:	Neighborhood	
Inequities	Across	an	Urban	Sphere.	Journal	of	Real	Estate	Research.	Summer	2008.	
Swartz	T.	and	Bonello,	F.	1993.	Urban	Finance	Under	Siege.	Sharpe	Inc.:	New	York	
Talen,	E.	1998.	Visualizing	Fairness:	Equity	Maps	for	Planners.		Journal	of	the	American	
Planning	Association.	64(1):	22‐38	
Tiebout,	C.	M.	1956.	A	pure	theory	of	local	expenditures.	Journal	of	Political	Economy	64(5)	
416‐424.	
Tobler,	W.R.	1970.	A	computer	movie	simulating	urban	growth	in	the	Detroit	region.	
Economic	Geography	46	(Supplement):	234‐240.	
Wallis,	J.	J.	2001.	A	History	of	the	Property	Tax	in	America.	In	Wallace	E.	Oates	(Ed.),	
Property	taxation	and	local	government	finance	(pp.	123‐151).	Cambridge,	MA:	
Lincoln	Institute	of	Land	Policy.	
	
Wasi,	N.	and	White,	E.	2005.	Property	Tax	Limitations	and	Mobility:	Lock‐in	Effect	of	
California’s	Proposition	13.	Brookings‐Wharton	Papers	on	Urban	Affairs	2005	(2005)	59‐
97	
Yoo.	E.	2009.	Area‐to‐point	Kriging	in	spatial	hedonic	pricing	models.	Journal	of	
Geographical	Systems.	11(4),	p381‐406	
Zodrow,	G.	R.	2001.	The	property	tax	as	a	capital	tax:	a	room	with	three	views.	National	Tax	
Journal,	54(1)	139‐156.	
71	
 
CITY	BUDGET	AND	FINANCIAL	INFORMATION	
Carlsbad,	CA.	2010.	City	of	Carlsbad,	California	2010‐2011	Operating	Budget	and	Capital	
Improvement	Program.		
Carlsbad,	CA.	2010.	City	of	Carlsbad,	California	Consolidated	Annual	Financial	Report.		
Chula	Vista,	CA.	2010.	City	of	Chula	Vista,	California	Adopted	Budget	2010‐2011.	
Chula	Vista,	CA.	2010.	City	of	Chula	Vista,	California	Consolidated	Annual	Financial	Report	
Coronado,	CA.	2010.	City	of	Coronado	Proposed	Two	Year	Financial	Plan	for	the	Two	Fiscal	
Years	2009‐2010	and	2010‐2011	
Coronado,	CA.	2010.	City	of	Coronado	Consolidated	Annual	Financial	Report	
Del	Mar,	CA.	2010.	City	of	Del	Mar	Operating	and	Capital	Budget	FY	2009‐2010	&	2010‐2011	
Del	Mar,	CA.	2010.	City	of	Del	Mar	Consolidated	Annual	Financial	Report	
El	Cajon,	CA.	2010.	City	of	El	Cajon,	California	Annual	Budget	for	Providing	City	Services	
Fiscal	Year	2010‐2011.	
El	Cajon,	CA.	2010.	City	of	El	Cajon	Consolidated	Annual	Financial	Report	
Encinitas,	CA.	2010.	City	of	Encinitas	Fiscal	Year	2009‐2010	and	2010‐2011	Operating	
Budget.	
Encinitas,	CA.	2010.	City	of	Encinitas	Consolidated	Annual	Financial	Report	(CAFR)	
Escondido,	CA.	2010.	Escondido	Operating	Budget	Fiscal	Year	2009‐2010.	
Escondido,	CA.	2010.	Escondido	Consolidated	Annual	Financial	Report	(CAFR)	
Imperial	Beach,	CA.	2010.	City	Of	Imperial	Beach	Fiscal	Year	2009‐2010	&	Fiscal	Year2010‐
2011	Proposed	Budgets.	
Imperial	Beach,	CA.	2010.	City	Of	Imperial	Consolidated	Annual	Financial	Report	(CAFR)	
La	Mesa,	CA.	2010.	City	of	La	Mesa	Budget	At	a	Glance	Fiscal	Year	2009‐2010	
La	Mesa,	CA.	2010.	City	of	La	Mesa	Consolidated	Annual	Financial	Report	(CAFR)	
Lemon	Grove,	CA.	2010.	City	of	Lemon	Grove,	California	Fiscal	Year	2009‐2010	Consolidated	
Budget.	
Lemon	Grove,	CA.	2010.	City	of	Lemon	Grove	Consolidated	Annual	Financial	Report	(CAFR)	
72	
 
National	City,	CA.	2010.	National	City,	California	Fiscal	Year	2009‐2010	Adopted	Budget	
National	City,	CA.	2010.	National	City	Consolidated	Annual	Financial	Report	(CAFR)	
Oceanside,	CA.	2010.	City	of	Oceanside	Financial	Forecast	Fiscal	Years	2009‐2015	As	of	
March	2010.	
Oceanside,	CA.	2010.	City	of	Oceanside	Consolidated	Annual	Financial	Report	(CAFR)	
Poway,	CA.	2010.	City	of	Poway,	California	Proposed	Financial	Program	Fiscal	Year	2009‐
2010.	
Poway,	CA.	2010.	City	of	Poway	Consolidated	Annual	Financial	Report	(CAFR)	
San	Diego,	CA.	2010.	City	of	San	Diego	Fiscal	Year	2010	Annual	Budget	
San	Diego,	CA.	2010.	City	of	San	Diego	Consolidated	Annual	Financial	Report	(CAFR)	
San	Marcos,	CA.	2010.	City	of	San	Marcos,	California	Operations	and	Maintenance	Budget	for	
Fiscal	Years	2009/10,	2010/11,	2011/12	Capital	Improvement	Projects	Budget	for	Fiscal	
Years2009/10	through	2015/16	
San	Marcos,	CA.	2010.	City	of	San	Marcos	Consolidated	Annual	Financial	Report	(CAFR)	
Santee,	CA.	2010.	City	of	Santee	AMENDED	BUDGET	OVERVIEW	FISCAL	YEARS	2009‐10	AND	
2010‐11.	
Santee,	CA.	2010.	City	of	Santee	Consolidated	Annual	Financial	Report	(CAFR)	
	
DATA	SOURCES	
Municipal	and	County	Revenue	and	Debt:	http://www.census.gov/govs/cog/	
State	and	local	Tax	Revenues:	http://www.census.gov/govs/	
California	County	and	Municipal	Shapefiles:	http://www.census.gov/geo/www/tiger/	
San	Diego	Parcel	and	Assessor	Book:	http://files.sangis.org/fileList_categorized.aspx	
 
73	
 
APPENDIX	A	
 
BROWN’S	10	POINT	FISCAL	ANALYSIS	
	
TABLE	A.1:	Municipal	Budget	Deficits	in	San	Diego	County 
	
	
	
	
Municipality	 Population	 Budget	Deficit	
Anticipated		
2010‐2011	
Percent	of	
Budget	
Carlsbad		 98,607  ‐$8,134,081  ‐3.21% 
Chula	Vista		 223,423  ‐$9,347,000  ‐3.22% 
Coronado		 26,248  ‐$4,480,899  ‐11.95% 
Del	Mar		 4,524  $0  0.00% 
El	Cajon		 96,867  ‐$52,147,075  ‐36.58% 
Encinitas		 62,815  ‐$1,425,115  ‐1.63% 
Escondido		 140,766  $0  0.00% 
Imperial	Beach		 27,563  $0  0.00% 
La	Mesa		 55,724  $0  0.00% 
Lemon	Grove		 25,363  ‐$5,722,900  ‐28.31% 
National	City		 63,537  ‐$4,236,126  ‐4.67% 
Oceanside	 174,925  ‐$4,344,000  ‐3.94% 
Poway		 50,542  ‐$395,490  ‐0.50% 
San	Diego		 1,311,162  ‐$144,434,838  ‐5.16% 
San	Marcos		 76,725  ‐$1,605,877  ‐2.12% 
Santee		 54,709  ‐$509,535  ‐1.67% 
Solana	Beach		 13,327  ‐$2,178,640  ‐9.70% 
Vista		 94,440  $0  0.00% 
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TABLE	A.2:	Ten	Point	Fiscal	Health	Analysis,	Base	Indicators	by	City	
		 REVENUE	 EXPENDITURE	
Municipality	
	
		 1a.	Total	
Anticipated	
Revenues	2010		
2a.	Total	
Revenue	in	GF	
2b.	Total	IG	
Revenue	in	
GF	(i.e.	fed	
grants)	
3a.	Total	
Operating	
Transfers	
into	GF	
4a.	Total	
Expenditures	
minus	Capital	
funds	
4b.	Total	
Expenditures	
(incl.	Capital	
funds)	
Carlsbad		 		 $253,330,050.00	 	 $109,300,000.00 $1,200,000.00 	 $6,656,000.00 	
$191,091,621.0
0
$261,464,131.0
0
Chula	Vista		 		 $290,639,000.00	 	 $132,966,000.00 $9,700,000.00 	
$12,340,000.0
0 	
$269,243,000.0
0
$299,986,000.0
0
Coronado		 		 $37,500,000.00	 	 $37,545,050.00 $0.00 	 $2,310,000.00 	 $37,360,899.00 $41,980,899.00
Del	Mar		 		 $24,187,541.00	 	 $10,329,127.00 $15,441.00 	 $0.00 	 $16,325,701.00 $24,187,541.00
El	Cajon		 		 $142,573,759.00	 	 $52,786,487.00 $5,489,130.00 	 $530,000.00 	
$118,491,584.0
0
$194,720,834.0
0
Encinitas		 		 $87,630,160.00	 	 $53,669,000.00 $3,321,000.00 	 $437,800.00 	 $79,535,355.00 $89,055,275.00
Escondido		 		 $189,358,255.00	 	 $72,944,365.00 $3,010,000.00 	 $2,711,600.00 	
$171,642,110.0
0
$189,358,255.0
0
Imp.	Beach		 		 $38,973,099.00	 	 $16,517,000.00 $237,000.00 	 $3,335,062.00 	 $23,909,017.00 $38,973,099.00
La	Mesa		 		 $122,245,590.00	 	 $33,330,100.00
$1,494,300.00
0 	 $3,857,000.00 	 $74,922,630.00
$122,245,590.0
0
Lemon	Grove		 		 $20,212,700.00	 	 $12,355,000.00 $11,000.00 	 $2,377,000.00 	 $25,935,600.00 $25,935,600.00
National	City		 		 $90,627,265.00	 	 $37,686,329.00 $576,400.00 	 $1,159,859.00 	 $82,370,636.00 $94,863,391.00
Oceanside	 		 $110,310,900.00	 	 $110,310,900.00 $1,221,900.00 	
$14,914,400.0
0 	
$114,654,900.0
0
$114,654,900.0
0
Poway		 		 $79,110,630.00	 	 $31,283,110.00 $0.00 	 $1,134,305.00 	 $77,373,120.00 $79,506,120.00
San	Diego		 		
$2,799,847,867.0
0	 	
$1,129,706,375.0
0 $1,160,315.00 	
$97,180,000.0
0 	 $2,465,844,789 $2,944,282,705
San	Marcos		 		 $75,815,184.00	 	 $60,588,402.00 $2,698,083.00 	 $1,132,953.00 	 $77,421,061.00 $77,421,061.00
Santee		 		 $30,580,870.00	 	 $30,580,870.00 $3,040,380.00 	 $417,410.00 	 $31,294,204.00 $31,294,20.004
Solana	Beach		 		 $22,460,300.00	 	 $13,655,168.00 $1,297,000.00 	 $1,046,467.00 	 $20,261,840.00 $24,638,940.00
Vista		 		 $61,506,390.00	 	 $58,809,277.00 $2,697,113.00 	 $6,214,815.00 	 $90,485,821.00
$109,770,209.0
0
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TABLE	A.2	(cont.):	Ten	Point	Fiscal	Health	Analysis,	Base	Indicators	by	City	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
		 OPERATING	POSITION	 DEBT	STRUCTURE	
Municipality	 		 6a.	Unreserved,	
Designated,	
Undesignated	
funds	in	GF	
7a.	Total	C&I	
in	GF	
9a.	General	
Obligation	Debt	
(repaid	from	
Property	Tax	
Revenue)	
		 10a.	Total	
Expenditures	
in	Debt	Service	
Fund	
Carlsbad		 		 $61,400,000.00 	 N/A	 	 $129,125,000.00	 		 $11,865,539.00 	
Chula	Vista		 		 $123,666,000.00 	 N/A	 	 $268,436,422.00	 		 $20,082,000.00 	
Coronado		 		 $28,130,250.00 	 N/A	 	 $140,402,300.000	 		 $45,742.000 	
Del	Mar		 		 $8,242,705.00 	 N/A	 	 $6,892,360.00	 		 $968,492.000 	
El	Cajon		 		 $42,077,729.00 	 N/A	 	 $113,396,603.00	 		 $15,218,760.00 	
Encinitas		 		 $33,389,000.00 	 $28,000,000.00 	 $75,058,982.00	 		 $6,792,182.00 	
Escondido		 		 $45,944,365.00 	 N/A	 	 $233,216,572.00	 		 $15,992,595.000 	
Imperial	
Beach		 		 $12,386,424.000 	 N/A	 	 $19,944,730.00	 		 $8,899,792.00 	
La	Mesa		 		 $12,873,480.00 	 N/A	 	 $153,010,522.00	 		 $2,986,640.00 	
Lemon	Grove		 		 $10,217,400.00 	 N/A	 	 $28,100,000.00	 		 $3,303,400.00 	
National	City		 		 $30,186,329.00 	 N/A	 	 $69,355,464.00	 		 $6,379,013.00 	
Oceanside	 		 $95,810,900.00 	 N/A	 	 $247,729,592.00	 		 $5,214,900.00 	
Poway		 		 $13,183,110.00 	 N/A	 	 $296,437,000.00	 		 $8,030,360.00 	
San	Diego		 		 $1,054,284,974.00 	 N/A	 	 $2,713,000,000.00	 		 $201,700,000.00 	
San	Marcos		 		 $909,676.00 	 N/A	 	 $9,233,039.00	 		 $472,728.00 	
Santee		 		 $8,097,206.00 	 N/A	 	 $29,700,000.00	 		 $202,690.00 	
Solana	Beach		 		 $8,723,856.00 	 N/A	 	 $33,050,628.00	 		 $1,721,835.00 	
Vista		 		 $11,196,593.00 	 N/A	 	 $53,873,800.000	 		 $17,210,535.00 	
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TABLE	A.3:	10	Point	Fiscal	Health	Analysis	Computed	Ratios	
 
		 REVENUE	 EXPENSES	
	 1.	Total	
Revenues	/	
Population	
2.	GF	
Revenues	
from	Own	
Sources	/	
Total	GF	
Fund	
Revenue	
3.	GF	Sources	
from	Other	
Funds	/	Total	
GF	Source	
4.	Operating	
Expenditures	/	
Total	
Expenditures	
Carlsbad		 $2,569.09 0.989 0.057 0.731
Chula	Vista		 $1,300.85 0.927 0.085 0.898
Coronado		 $1,428.68 1.000 0.058 0.890
Del	Mar		 $5,346.49 0.999 0.000 0.675
El	Cajon		 $1,471.85 0.896 0.010 0.609
Encinitas		 $1,395.05 0.938 0.008 0.893
Escondido		 $1,345.20 0.959 0.036 0.906
Imp.	Beach		 $1,413.96 0.986 0.168 0.613
La	Mesa		 $2,193.77 0.955 0.104 0.613
Lemon	Grove		 $796.94 0.999 0.161 1.000
Nat.	City		 $1,426.37 0.985 0.030 0.868
Oceanside	 $630.62 0.989 0.119 1.000
Poway		 $1,565.25 1.000 0.035 0.973
San	Diego		 $2,135.39 0.999 0.079 0.838
San	Marcos		 $988.14 0.955 0.018 1.000
Santee		 $558.97 0.901 0.013 1.000
Solana	Beach		 $1,685.32 0.905 0.071 0.822
Vista		 $651.27 0.954 0.096 0.824
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TABLE	A.3	(cont.):	10	Point	Fiscal	Health	Analysis	Computed	Ratios	
 
OPERATING	POSITION
DEBT	STRUCTURE	
Municipality	 5.	Revenue	/	
Expenditures	
6.	Unreserved	
GF	Balance	/	
GF	Revenue	
7.	GF	C&I	/	
GF	
Liabilities	
8.	GF	
Liabilities	/	
GF	
Reserves	
9.	Long‐Term	
Debt	/	
Population	
10.	Debt	Service	/	
Revenues	
Carlsbad		 0.969	 0.562	 N/A	 0.438	 $1,309.49	 0.047	
Chula	Vista		 0.969	 0.930	 N/A	 0.070	 $1,201.47	 0.069	
Coronado		 0.893	 0.749	 N/A	 0.251	 $5,349.07	 0.001	
Del	Mar		 1.000	 0.798	 N/A	 0.202	 $1,523.51	 0.040	
El	Cajon		 0.732	 0.797	 N/A	 0.203	 $1,170.64	 0.107	
Encinitas		 0.984	 0.622	 1.381	 0.378	 $1,194.92	 0.078	
Escondido		 1.000	 0.630	 N/A	 0.370	 $1,656.77	 0.084	
Imp.	Beach		 1.000	 0.750	 N/A	 0.250	 $723.61	 0.228	
La	Mesa		 1.000	 0.386	 N/A	 0.614	 $2,745.86	 0.024	
Lemon	Grove		 0.779	 0.827	 N/A	 0.173	 $1,107.91	 0.163	
Nat.	City		 0.955	 0.801	 N/A	 0.199	 $1,091.58	 0.070	
Oceanside	 0.962	 0.869	 N/A	 0.131	 $1,416.20	 0.047	
Poway		 0.995	 0.421	 N/A	 0.579	 $5,865.16	 0.102	
San	Diego		 0.951	 0.933	 N/A	 0.067	 $2,069.16	 0.072	
San	Marcos		 0.979	 0.015	 N/A	 0.985	 $120.34	 0.006	
Santee		 0.977	 0.265	 N/A	 0.735	 $542.87	 0.007	
Solana	Beach		 0.912	 0.639	 N/A	 0.361	 $2,479.98	 0.077	
Vista		 0.560	 0.190	 N/A	 0.810	 $570.46	 0.280	
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TABLE	A.4:	10	Point	Fiscal	Health	Analysis	Comparison	Tables,	POPULATION	UP	TO	30,000	
Population	15,000‐30,000		 Population	less	than	15,000	
1 2 3 4 1	 2 3 4
Index	Ratio	 <	25%	
(WORST)
50% 75% 75‐100%	
(BEST)	
<	25%	
(WORST)
50% 75% 75‐100%	
(BEST)	
1	 Total	Revenue/																										
Total	Population	 $1,271	 $918	 $622	 $622	 	 $1,405	 $888	 $702	 $702	
2	 Total	General	Fund	
Revenues/Total	Revenues	 77.7	 88.6	 98.3	 98.3	 	 76.4	 89.2	 96.7	 96.7	
3	 General	Fund	sources	
from	Other	Funds/Total	
General	Fund	Sources	
5.987	 1.157	 0.001	 0.001	 	 8.089	 1.27	 0.001	 0.001	
4	 Operating	
Expenditures/Total	
Expenditures	
97.9	 91.1	 81.9	 81.9	 	 99	 92.2	 80.3	 80.3	
5	 Total	Revenues/Total	
Expenditures	 0.876	 0.954	 1.034	 1.034	 	 0.868	 0.962	 1.038	 1.038	
6	 Unreserved	general	Fund	
Balance/Total	General	
Fund	Revenues	
0.104	 0.218	 0.986	 0.986	 	 0.173	 0.278	 0.444	 0.444	
7	 Total	general	fund	cash	
and	investments/total	
general	fund	liabilities	
0.819	 1.865	 4.719	 4.719	 	 1.162	 2.522	 5.761	 5.761	
8	 Total	general	fund	
liabilities/	Total	general	
fund	revenues	
0.208	 0.104	 0.061	 0.061	 	 0.189	 0.102	 0.0057	 0.0057	
9	 Direct	Long	Term	
Debt/Population	 $622	 $254	 $15	 $15	 	 $628	 $166	 $2	 $2	
10	 Debt	Service/Total	
Revenues	 0.133	 0.063	 0.011	 0.011	 	 0.105	 0.039	 0.001	 0.001	
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TABLE	A.5:	10	Point	Fiscal	Health	Analysis	Comparison	Tables,	POPULATION	GREATER	THAN	30,000	
Population	100,000	+	 Population	30,000‐100,000		
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Index	Ratio	 <	25%	
(WORST)
50% 75% 75‐100%	
(BEST)	
<	25%	
(WORST)
50% 75% 75‐100%	
(BEST)	
1	 Total	Revenue/Total	
Population	 $1,363	 $1,016 $819	 $819	 	 $1,205	 $941	 $762	 $762	
2	 Total	General	Fund	
Revenues/Total	Revenues	 80.2	 87.7	 96.8	 96.8	 	 77.5	 97.4	 96.4	 96.4	
3	 General	Fund	sources	from	
Other	Funds/Total	General	
Fund	Sources	
7.285	 2.083	 0.003	 0.003	 	 6.598	 2.438 0.001	 0.001	
4	 Operating	Expenditures/							
Total	Expenditures	 95.8	 88.9	 81.6	 81.6	 	 94.4	 86.5	 77.4	 77.4	
5	 Total	Revenues/	Total	
Expenditures	 0.0878	 0.964	 1.038	 1.038	 	 0.864	 0.952 1.034	 1.034	
6	 Unreserved	general	Fund	
Balance/Total	General	Fund	
Revenues	
0.086	 0.18	 0.3	 0.3	 	 0.133	 0.211 0.338	 0.338	
7	 Total	general	fund	cash	and	
investments/total	general	
fund	liabilities	
0.622	 1.529	 30372	 30372	 	 0.916	 1.909 3.525	 3.525	
8	 Total	general	fund	liabilities/	
Total	general	fund	revenues	 0.254	 0.101	 0.069	 0.069	 	 0.193	 0.099 0.063	 0.063	
9	 Direct	Long	Term	
Debt/Population	 $788	 $384	 $40	 $40	 	 $794	 $269	 $29	 $29	
10	 Debt	Service/Total	Revenues	 0.134	 0.074	 0.041	 0.041	 0.146	 0.08	 0.025	 0.025	
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TABLE	A.6:	10	Point	Fiscal	Health	Analysis	Composite	Scores	
Municipality		 Population	 Index	1	 Index	2	 Index	3	 Index	4	 Index	5	 Index	6	 Index	8	 Index	9	 Index10	 Composite	Score	
Carlsbad		 98,607	 ‐1 2 1 2 0	 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 1 2
Chula	Vista		 223,423	 ‐1 1 1 1 0	 ‐1 2 ‐1 1 3
Coronado		 26,248	 ‐1 2 1 1 0	 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 0 0
Del	Mar		 4,524	 ‐1 2 2 2 1	 ‐1 0 ‐1 1 5
El	Cajon		 96,867	 ‐1 1 1 2 ‐1	 ‐1 0 1 0 2
Encinitas		 62,815	 ‐1 0 1 0 1	 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 0 ‐2
Escondido		 140,766	 0 0 1 0 1	 0 ‐1 ‐1 0 0
Imperial	Beach		 27,563	 ‐1 2 1 2 1	 0 ‐1 0 ‐1 3
La	Mesa		 55,724	 ‐1 0 1 2 1	 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 1 1
Lemon	Grove		 25,363	 1 2 1 ‐1 ‐1	 ‐1 0 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1
National	City		 63,537	 ‐1 2 1 1 0	 ‐1 0 ‐1 0 1
Oceanside	 174,925	 2 2 1 ‐1 0	 0 0 ‐1 0 3
Poway		 50,542	 ‐1 2 1 ‐1 1	 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐2
San	Diego		 1,311,162	 ‐1 2 1 1 0	 0 ‐1 ‐1 1 2
San	Marcos		 76,725	 2 0 1 ‐1 1	 2 ‐1 0 2 6
Solana	Beach		 54,709	 2 0 1 ‐1 1	 0 ‐1 ‐1 1 2
Santee		 13,327	 ‐1 0 1 1 0	 0 ‐1 ‐1 0 ‐1
Vista		 94,440	 2 1 1 1 0	 0 0 0 ‐1 4
 
